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Whose Genes Are These Anyway?: Familial Conflicts over 
Access to Genetic Information 
Sonia M. Suter 
INTRODUCTION 
In the latter part of this century, scientists began to determine the 
genetic bases of many diseases. 1 Recently, the identification of disease 
genes has escalated dramatically, particularly in the last decade.2 To 
support such research, Congress decided to fund the Human Genome 
Project: a three-billion-dollar effort to map and sequence the entire 
human genome. 3 One of the project's major goals is to identify all 
disease genes to help test for, understand, and, ultimately, cure genetic 
disease.4 
The ability to "decode" what is to many the basis of a person's 
identity - one's genes - has significant implications for individuals, 
families, and society at large. Although many applaud genetic re-
search and the Human Genome Project, 5 others are concerned about 
potential misuse of genetic information6 or at least the legal and ethi-
1. Victor A. McKusick, The Human Genome Project: Plans, Status, and Applications in Biol-
ogy and Medicine, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 18, 22-26 (George 
J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992) [hereinafter GENE MAPPING]. 
2. Id. at 20 (fig. 2-1), 21 (fig. 2-2), 25-26. 
3. The genome is the pattern of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that codes for proteins and 
physical processes. Funding for the Project began in 1990 and is expected to continue until 2005. 
See James D. Watson, The Human Genome Project: Past, Present, and Future, 248 SCIENCE 44 
(1990). 
4. In addition, scientists hope to use this information to understand the disease process in 
general. James D. Watson & Robert M. Cook-Deegan, The Human Genome Project and Inter-
national Health, 263 JAMA 3322 (1990). The more distant goal of curing genetic disease in-
volves the development of gene therapy, in which the defective gene or its product is altered. See 
A. Dusty Miller, Human Gene Therapy Comes of Age, 357 NATURE 455 (1992); lnder M. 
Verma, Gene Therapy, Sci. AM., Nov. 1990, at 68. 
5. Genetics and the Public Interest, 356 NATURE 365, 365 (1992) [hereinafter Public Interest]; 
Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic 
Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 110 (1991). This is not to say that the 
Project does not have vociferous opponents who claim it is bad science and a waste of scarce and 
valuable funding resources. See, e.g., Robert N. Proctor, Genomics and Eugenics: How Fair is 
the Comparison?, in GENE MAPPING, supra note l, at 57, 65; Leslie Roberts, Genome Backlash 
Going Full Force, 284 SCIENCE 804 (1990). 
6. Goslin, supra note 5, at 110, 112; Proctor, supra note 5, at 58-59; Jody W. Zylke, Examin-
ing Life's (Genomic) Code Means Reexamining Society's Long-Held Codes, 267 JAMA 1715 
(1992). This fear is not unfounded, as the history of genetic science has been plagued with abuse. 
Around the tum of the century, several states passed legislation allowing the involuntary sterili-
zation of people with mental retardation. Proctor, supra note 5, at 61; Zylke, supra, at 1715. 
Similarly, the Nazis abused and misrepresented genetics in pursuit of eugenic goals. Theodore 
Friedmann, Opinion: The Human Genome Project - Some Implications of Extensive "Reverse 
Genetic" Medicine, 46 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 407, 411 (1990); Public Interest, supra note 5, at 
365; Evelyne Shuster, Determinism and Reductionism: A Greater Threat Because of the Human 
1854 
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cal issues it creates.7 As genetic information becomes increasingly 
available, control of that information gains importance. For example, 
if third parties, especially institutional third parties such as insurers or 
employers, have access to genetic data, they might discriminate on the 
basis of that information. 8 
Genetic testing presents equally problematic issues regarding ac-
cess to genetic information by private third parties, specifically, family 
members. Conflicts of interest may arise between an individual and 
her relatives, who may personally benefit from learning about the indi-
vidual's genetic status.9 Similarly, when genetic testing requires the 
involvement of other family members, people may try to compel un-
willing relatives to participate. 
These issues arise in at least two contexts involving competing in-
terests between family members.10 Numerous conflicts may arise re-
garding the disclosure of results when testing has already been 
performed. The person tested - the proband - may want to avoid 
harm from disclosure, while the relative may be able to prevent harm 
to herself by receiving the information. Physicians and genetic coun-
selors may feel bound to inform the relative and also bound to protect 
patient confidentiality. Second, when genetic testing of one person can 
benefit another family member, privacy and autonomy interests of the 
former may collide with the relative's interests in protecting her health 
or planning her future. Such questions have not yet come before the 
courts. However, as more people are faced with these problems, they 
Genome Project?, in GENE MAPPING, supra note 1, at 115, 116; Zylke, supra, at 1715. Other, 
more subtle, forms of misuse occurred in the 1970s when states instituted screening programs for 
sickle cell anemia. Poor planning and inadequate education created misunderstandings regard-
ing the difference between carriers of sickle cell disease and those who actually had the disease. 
Consequently, many carriers suffered from insurance and employment discrimination, as well as 
unfounded fear and anxiety with regard to their own health. Leslie Roberts, One Worked; The 
Other Didn't, 247 SCIENCE 18 (1990); Benjamin S. Wilfond & Norman Fost, The Cystic Fibrosis 
Gene: Medical and Social Implications for Heterozygote Detection, 263 JAMA 2777, 2778 (1990). 
Similar problems arose in the 1960s when states mandated phenylketonuria (PKU) screening for 
newborns even though the technique was unperfected. As a result, some children with PKU 
received improper treatment and some unaffected children were incorrectly identified as having 
the disease. Wilfond & Fost, supra, at 2778. 
7. Frequently discussed concerns involve insurance and employment discrimination, access 
to genetic information, and issues of privacy. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confi-
dentiality of Genetic Informati'on in the Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75 (1991); John C. 
Fletcher & Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethics, Law, and Medical Genetics: After the Human Genome Is 
Mapped, 39 EMORY L.J. 747 (1990); Marvin R. Natowicz et al., Genetic Discrimination and the 
Law, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 465 (1992). 
8. Already, some health maintenance organizations have told families they would not pro-
vide for the care of children born with prenatally diagnosed cystic fibrosis. Zylke, supra note 6, 
at 1715. 
9. See, e.g., Fletcher & Wertz, supra note 7, at 763-64; Judith Hall, The Concerns of Doctors 
and Patients, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS 23, 27 (Bruce Hilton et al. eds., 1973). 
10. This Note focuses only on these discrete issues, recognizing, however, that many other 
interests are at stake in the genetic testing context, for example, insurance companies' and em-
ployers' interests. See supra note 7. 
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may try to argue that the state has the authority to compel genetic 
testing or that a court may order the disclosure of test results. 11 
This Note argues first that courts and legislatures should follow a 
presumption against mandating disclosure of a person's genetic infor-
mation to third parties. Second, genetic testing for the benefit of a 
third party should not, and constitutionally cannot, be compelled. 
Part I presents an overview of genetics and discusses the special legal 
and ethical issues genetic testing poses. Part II examines the issue of 
nonconsensual disclosure to family members, who could potentially 
use the information from tests that have already been performed. This 
Part concludes that there should be a presumption against disclosure. 
Part III examines a related, but different, question regarding the con-
stitutionality of mandatory genetic screening of an individual for the 
benefit of her family. It contends that such compulsory testing is un-
constitutional and that public policy argues against it. Part IV offers 
legislative and judicial guidelines that prohibit mandatory genetic test-
ing for the benefit of another family member and allow disclosure of 
test results only when the harm in failing to disclose significantly out-
weighs the harm from disclosure. 
I. OVERVIEW OF GENETICS AND GENETIC TESTING 
To illustrate how genetic testing may lead to conflicts of interest 
between family members, this Part presents an overview of genetics. 
Any judicial or legislative decisionmaking should take into account 
the concepts described. Section I.A explains basic genetic concepts, 
including the modes of inheritance for various genetic diseases. Sec-
tion I.B discusses the ways in which genetic data are different from 
other types of medical data. Section l.C examines how genetic data 
can be used to test for disease· and explores the limitations of current 
methods of genetic testing. Finally, section I.D presents hypothetical 
situations in which conflicts of interest regarding genetic testing and 
data might arise among family members. The hypotheticals will illus-
trate the legal and ethical issues discussed in Parts II and III. 
A. Inheritance and Genetic Disease 
Genetics largely dictates who a human being is physically and, to 
some extent, psychologically. The human genome is composed of 
twenty-three pairs of chromosomes, forty-six in all, 12 which carry 
thousands of genes. The set of genes each person inherits constitutes 
11. This Note grew out of the author's two years of experience as a genetic counselor. Many 
of the examples and concerns discussed are based on actual cases. 
12. The 46 chromosomes exist in 23 homologous pairs. The twenty-third pair is responsible 
for gender: females have two X chromosomes; males, an X and Y. See ALAN E.H. EMERY & 
ROBERT F. MUELLER, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL GENETICS 108-09 (7th ed. 1988). Everyone 
inherits one of each pair of chromosomes from each parent. Id. at 108. 
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her genotype, and a person's observable traits - eye color, height, hair 
type, and so forth - comprise her phenotype. 13 Genes regulate the 
body's production of individual proteins, 14 which ultimately determine 
phenotype. Genotype alone controls much of a person's phenotype, 
especially traits that are not immediately apparent, like blood type. 
Other physical traits, such as height, weight, and intelligence, are in-
fluenced by environmental factors15 and are only partially linked to 
genotype. Very few traits, for instance, hairstyle, are completely in-
dependent of genotype. This Note concentrates on a particular pheno-
type, genetic disease, which is fundainentally dependent on genotype. 
Genetic diseases arise from mutations, that is, alterations in the 
DNA. Mutations occur infrequently when genes pass from one gener-
ation to another. 16 They are often harmless, either because the change 
within a gene does not affect protein production or because the muta-
tion occurs in a region of DNA that does not encode proteins. Muta-
tions can be deleterious, however, if they disrupt a gene's normal 
function. If parts of a gene are missing, rearranged, substituted, or 
even supplemented with extra DNA, the body will make an altered or 
deficient protein or sometimes will produce no protein at all. When 
that protein is crucial to biological function, disease results. 17 
Because everyone has two sets of each gene, one on each pair of 
chromosomes, it is possible for a person to have both a "normal," 
functioning gene and a homologous, nonfunctioning gene. Often the 
normal gene compensates for the deficient gene so that the person is 
completely healthy with respect to that gene. Such people are carriers 
for the nonworking gene, which is recessive to the working gene. Au-
tosomal recessive diseases occur only when both genes in a pair func-
13. Similarities between the phenotypes of family members exist because a significant per-
centage of genetic material is shared among them. A person shares 50% of her genes with her 
mother and 50% with her father. On average, a person also shares 50% of the same genetic 
material with each sibling, although that number varies depending on the particular genes each 
received from the parents. PETER s. HARPER, PRACTICAL GENETIC COUNSELLING 113 (3d ed. 
1988). 
14. Proteins are essential for biological processes and are found in everything from the en-
zymes that break down food to muscle tissue. EMERY & MUELLER, supra note 12, at 19-22. 
15. See EMERY & MUELLER, supra note 12, at 199; MEDICAL GENETICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE 353-54 (James J. Nora & F. Clarke Fraser eds., 2d ed. 1981). 
16. John B. Stanbury et al., Inborn Errors of Metabolism in the 1980s, in THE METABOLIC 
BASIS OF INHERITED DISEASE 3, 9-10 (John B. Stanbury et al. eds., 5th ed. 1983); Friedrich 
Vogel, Mutation in Man, in 1 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL GENETICS 53, 53 (Alan 
E.H. Emery & David L. Rimoin eds., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE]. 
17. The severity of the disease depends on the role of the protein. Sickle cell anemia, for 
example, is caused by a mutation in the gene for hemoglobin, which is essential to the transport 
of oxygen throughout the body. The substituted DNA pattern causes the red blood cells to 
deform into a sickle shape, which can prevent normal circulation of blood throughout the sys-
tem. Many people with sickle cell anemia suffer from pain crises, infection, serious health 
problems, and sometimes early death. See John A. Phillips III & Haig H. Kazazian, Jr., 
Haemog/obinopathies and Thalassaemias, in 2 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 
1315, 1324-25. 
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tion improperly. 18 In other circumstances, a single nonworking gene 
causes disease, even when the homologous gene functions properly. 
The nonworking gene and the resulting disease are said to be domi-
nant.19 A third type of single-gene, or monogenic, disease2° is X-
linked and generally only affects males. If a male carries a recessive 
disease gene on the X chromosome, he has no complementing gene on 
the Y chromosome to compensate. Consequently, he will develop the 
disease. A female who carries the same disease gene on one X chro-
mosome will usually have a homologous, functional gene on the other 
X chromosome. As a result, she will be an unaffected carrier. 
Everyone probably carries between three and nine deleterious or 
disease genes, most of which are recessive.21 Most people are unaware 
of the deleterious genes they carry because the genes can pass through 
a family for generations without manifesting as disease. A couple can 
have children with an autosomal recessive disease only if both parents 
are carriers for the same recessive disease gene. 22 Even then, there is 
only a 25% chance that each child will be affected.23 If one of the 
deleterious genes is dominant, the individual will generally know she is 
a carrier because the gene causes disease. The carrier's risk of passing 
the dominant gene to future offspring is 50%.24 Some dominant 
genes, however, usually do not produce observable effects until late in 
life. Illnesses like Huntington's disease and adult polycystic kidney 
disease have long latency periods.25 Those who carry such genes can, 
therefore, unwittingly pass them to their children, who will eventually 
develop the disease if they live long enough. 
18. Rosalind Skinner, Unifactorial Inheritance, in 1 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 
16, at 95, 99. Autosomal genetic diseases involve mutations on the autosomal chromosomes -
the first 22 pairs of chromosomes - as opposed to x-linked genetic diseases that involve muta-
tions on the sex chromosomes. See supra note 12 and infra text accompanying notes 20-21. 
19. Id. at 97. 
20. Monogenic diseases, or single gene disorders, involve a single gene locus as opposed to 
polygenic diseases, which involve many gene loci. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
21. The number is a rough estimate. Catherine J. Damme, Controlling Genetic Disease 
Through Law, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 801, 808 (1982); James R. Sorenson, Some Social and 
Psychologic Issues in Genetic Screening: Public and Professional Adaptation to Biomedical Inno-
vation, in ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF SCREENING FOR HUMAN GENETIC 
DISEASE 165, 178 (Daniel Bergsma ed., 1974) [hereinafter ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL 
DIMENSIONS]. 
22. This presumes that no new mutations will occur in the sperm or egg cell. 
23. On average, 50% of the offspring will be carriers and unaffected like the parents, 25% 
will be affected, and the remaining 25% will be completely free of the gene. These percentages, 
of course, reflect the odds every time a child is conceived. It is possible for individual families to 
have completely different percentages of affected, carrier, and noncarrier children. 
24. This assumes that the carrier's partner is not a carrier for the same dominant mutation, 
which is generally the case. If, however, the partner carries the same dominant gene, there will 
be a 75% chance that the offspring will carry at least one of the dominant genes and only a 25% 
chance of having a child who will be free of the disease gene and the disease. It is quite rare, 
however, to find individuals who are homozygous, - that is, who carry two similar alleles or 
DNA patterns for a particular gene-for dominant disease genes. Skinner, supra note 18, at 97. 
25. HARPER, supra note 13, at 22. 
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Monogenic diseases have been the most commonly studied diseases 
in classical, or "Mendelian,"26 genetics. There are, however, other 
types of genetic disease.27 The inheritance of extra or deficient 
amounts of chromosomal material results in the addition or loss of 
hundreds or thousands of genes. 28 The duplication or deletion of so 
many genes generally causes syndromes that adversely affect many 
systems of the body.29 The most common chromosomal abnormality 
is trisomy 21, or Down's syndrome,30 in which the affected person 
carries not two but three chromosome number 21s.3 t 
B. Uniqueness of Genetic Data 
The various types of genetic disease share common features that 
distinguish them from other diseases. First, there are significant differ-
ences between genetic and contagious diseases. Genetic disease is in-
herited and can only be vertically transmitted through generations. 
Contagious disease, however, can be horizontally transmitted within 
generations.32 That is, in genetics, the connections depend on biologi-
cal relations between people; in contagious disease contexts, the im-
pact on others is through some form of contact. In addition, the 
methods of control between the two types of disease differ. Conta-
gious disease is controlled through isolation of the affected people or 
avoidance of whatever contact causes infection; genetic disease is con-
26. Mendel, a Moravian monk who lived in the 1800s, is considered the father of genetics for 
his work with the garden pea, which demonstrated recessive and dominant patterns of inheri-
tance. See EMERY & MUELLER, supra note 12, at 2-6. 
27. See Amo Motulsky, The Significance of Genetic Disease, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN 
GENETICS: GENETIC CoUNSELlNG AND THE USE OF GENETIC KNOWLEDGE 59, 59-60 (Bruce 
Hilton et al. eds., 1973). Motulsky considers a fourth category of genetic disease - immunologic 
materno-fetal incompatibility - which he notes physicians do not usually consider a genetic 
disease. 
28. The 46 chromosomes carry a total of 50,000 - 100,000 pairs of genes. Victor A. McK-
usick, Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY 
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 2, 5 tbl. B (Mark A. Rothstein, ed., 1991) (proceedings of 
conference held in Houston, Tex., Mar. 7-9, 1991). 
29. See EMERY & MUELLER, supra note 12, at 124-2; HARPER, supra note 13, at 49-62. 
More or less than the normal amount of genetic material can cause severe defects and health 
problems. See BERNICE L. MUIR, EssENTIALS OF GENETICS FOR NURSES 195 (1983). 
30. HARPER, supra note 13, at 53. 
31. Another category of genetic disease includes polygenic and multifactorial diseases, such 
as diabetes, cancer, and hypertension. Polygenic diseases are caused by a combination of genes; 
multifactorial diseases result from a combination of genetic and environmental factors. See EM-
ERY & MUELLER, supra note 12, at 199; Lee Ehrman & Marc Lappe, Screening for Polygenic 
Disorders, in ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 21, at 101; Motulsky, supra 
note 27, at 60. 
32. Damme, supra note 21, at 814. Of course, a person from one generation can infect a 
person of another generation with a contagious disease; for example, a mother can give her 
daughter a cold and vice versa. The distinction indicates that while infectious diseases are spread 
to those who are alive at the same time, regardless of biological relationship, genetic disease can 
only be passed unidirectionally, from parent to child, not vice versa. Moreover, it cannot be 
passed within generations from sibling to sibling or cousin to cousin, for example. 
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trolled through reproductive decisions and actions. 33 In the future, 
genetic disease will also be controlled to some extent by gene therapy: 
replacing nonworking genes with functional genes. 34 
Genetic data are also unique in how they may affect self-identity.35 
Empirical evidence shows that the knowledge or assumption that one 
carries certain disease genes can affect self-perception. Such evidence 
has important consequences for the management of genetic testing. 
Research on presymptomatic testing for Huntington's disease, for ex-
ample, indicates that people who assume that they do or do not carry 
the gene develop notions about themselves and their role in the world, 
based on these assumptions. 36 Many are troubled by test results that 
contradict these assumptions and challenge their self-perceptions. 
Although researchers expected individuals to struggle with news that 
they carried the gene, it was surprising that 10% of the potential carri-
ers experienced difficulty when they learned they did not carry the 
gene.37 
A particularly poignant example involved a woman who struggled 
with the new information that she had a very low risk of Huntington's. 
Because she had lived as though she would develop the disease, the 
knowledge of the low risk changed her self-perception, causing her to 
ask "If I'm not at risk - who am 1?"38 Follow-up counseling revealed 
that she 
ha[d] derived much of her sense of identity through her close relation-
ship with her older brother [who had Huntington's] and the expectation 
that she would develop [the] disease. She saw her role as both helping 
her brother and coping positively with [Huntington's]. When she was 
found to have a low risk ... she was forced to reevaluate her identity and 
her role in the family . . . . 39 
Not only does genetic knowledge potentially affect notions of iden-
tity, but its implications extend beyond the individual.40 A person 
33. Id. at 814. 
34. Clifford Grobstein & Michael Flower, Gene Therapy: Proceed with Caution, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Apr. 1984, at 13, 13; Miller, supra note 4, at 455. For examples of progress being 
made in the area of gene therapy in animal models, see Stephen C. Hyde et al., Correction of the 
Ion Transport Defect in Cystic Fibrosis Transgenic Mice by Gene Therapy, 362 NATURE 250 
(1993); Shoushu Jiao et al., Long-Term Correction of Rat Model of Parkinson's Disease by Gene 
Therapy, 362 NATURE 450 (1993). 
35. Richard M. Glass, AAAS Conference Explores Ethical Aspects of Large Pedigree Genetic 
Research, 261 JAMA 2158 (1992). Knowing whether one carries a disease gene can affect the 
way one perceives oneself and one's relationship to family and the world. For a fuller discussion 
see infra note 249. 
36. Marlene Huggins et al., Predictive Testing for Huntington Disease in Canada: Adverse 
Effects and Unexpected Results in Those Receiving a Decreased Risk. 42 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 
508, 508, 514-15 (1992). 
37. Id. at 508. 
38. Id. at 510. 
39. Id. at 511. 
40. Glass, supra note 35, at 2158. 
June 1993) Note - Genetic Information . 1861 
with a genetic disease has a significant risk of passing the nonworking 
gene to future offspring. Further, genetic disease is usually caused by 
the inheritance of a familial disease gene.41 Therefore, whenever a dis-
ease gene is detected, there is a good probability that some siblings, 
parents, aunts, uncles, or other relatives may also carry the gene, par-
ticularly if it is recessive and lies unexpressed for many generations. 
This unique feature creates the legal and ethical dilemmas that this 
Note discusses. 
C. Types of Genetic Testing and Their Limitations 
In the past, most genetic diseases were detected through clinical 
diagnosis alone.42 Now, genetic screening can confirm or replace 
clinical diagnosis for many genetic diseases. 43 There are four different 
types of genetic testing,44 depending on who is tested- and for what 
purpose. Carrier testing determines whether a healthy individual car-
ries a disease gene. 45 People often use the information to ascertain the 
risks of having children with the disease.46 Genetic counselors might 
offer such testing because of a patient's ethnic background47 or family 
41. There are, however, genetic syndromes in which a significant percentage of affected indi-
viduals carry a new mutation. That is, the disease gene does not pass through the family but 
arises as the result of a new mutation in either the sperm or egg cell. This phenomenon is most 
common in dominantly inherited syndromes, see Skinner, supra note 18, at 99, such as 
neurofibromatosis, see infra note 55, and achondroplasia (a particular form of dwarfism, in which 
the limbs are disproportionately short). See David L. Rimoin & R.S. Lachman, The Chondrodys-
plasias, in 2 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 895, 910-11 tbl. 56.1. 1990. 
42. See C. Thomas Caskey, Genetic Predisposition and the Human Genome Project: Case 
Illustrations of Clinical Problems: Presymptomatic Genetic Diagnosis - A Worry for the United 
States, in GENE MAPPING, supra note 1, at 177, 178. For a nice summary of the way in which 
clinical diagnoses are made, see THADDEUS E. KELLY, CLINICAL GENETICS AND GENETIC 
COUNSELING 257-341 (2d ed. 1986). 
43. See Caskey, supra note 42, at 178; Edward R.B. McCabe, Genetic Screening for the Next 
Decade: Application of Present and New Technologies, 64 YALEJ. BIOLOGY & MED. 9, 9 (1991); 
McKusick, supra note 1, at 36-39. 
44. See Ethics, Law, and the Human Genome, 256 SCIENCE 549 (1992) (discussing three 
types of genetic testing). 
45. KELLY, supra note 42, at 74-75. 
46. See id. at 250; Richard West, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Disease and Genetic Counselling, 
14 J. MED. ETHICS 194, 194-95 (1988). 
47. Certain ethnic groups, by virtue of sharing a greater percentage of genetic material, are 
more prone to carry particular disease genes. See generally KENNETH L. GARVER & SANDRA 
G. MARCHESE, GENETIC CoUNSELING FOR CLINICIANS 60-68 (1986). People of African de-
scent, for example, have a one in eight to twelve chance of carrying the gene for sickle cell 
anemia. HARPER, supra note 13, at 256; Phillips & Kazazian, supra note 17, at 1324. One in 25 
to 30 people of Ashkenazi Jewish heritage carries a copy of the gene for Tay-Sachs, a progressive 
neurological disorder that usually strikes in infancy and results in death by the age of two to 
three years. Severe retardation develops into "dementia, blindness, paralysis, and death." MEDI-
CAL GENETICS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 223; °John S. O'Brien, The Gan-
gliosidoses, in THE METABOLIC BASIS OF INHERITED DISEASE, supra note 16, at 945, 949 (John 
B. Stanbury et al. eds., 5th ed. 1983). It is thought that heterozygous carriers for some of these 
diseases may have had a selective advantage. Thus in Africa, where malaria is so widespread, 
heterozygous carriers of sickle cell anemia are better equipped to battle the disease. LUBERT 
STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 95-96 (2d ed. 1981). Some have theorized that Tay-Sachs carriers were 
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history of the disease. It also may involve presymptomatic or predic-
tive testing when people at risk for late onset diseases, like Hunting-
ton's, are tested for the likelihood of carrying the gene.4 8 
Second, prenatal testing is used to determine whether a fetus will 
be affected with a genetic disease. 49 Prenatal testing is often per-
formed after one or both parents have been identified as carriers. 
Couples do not always choose prenatal testing with a view to termi-
nate an affected fetus. They may simply desire the information to pre-
pare psychologically for either outcome or to help the obstetrician 
prepare for potential complications in delivery.so Often couples are 
tested without knowing what they will do if the fetus is affected.st Re-
gardless of the ultimate decision, prenatal testing directly influences 
reproductive decisions and care. 
Related to prenatal testing is newborn screening. As the name 
suggests, this form of genetic testing is performed on neonates. State 
legislatures regulate such screening; different states require screening 
for different diseases in which environment plays a large role. s2 Fi-
nally, the least common type of testing is for susceptibility to disease, 
such as alpha-1-antitrypsin deficiency.53 Screening in this area will in-
crease as scientists learn more about multifactorial diseases such as 
diabetes, cancer, and heart disease. 
Genetic screening has weaknesses, however, some of which are re-
more resistant to tuberculosis, which ran rampant among many Ashkenazi Jews in urban set-
tings. Lynn B. Jorde, Genetic Diseases in the Ashkenazi Population: Evolutionary Considerations, 
in GENETIC DIVERSITY AMONG JEWS 30S, 313 (Batsheva Bonne-Tamir & A vinoam Adam eds., 
1992). Selective advantage may not entirely explain why certain ethnic groups are more likely to 
share certain genetic diseases. It may simply be that the common ancestry has allowed a single 
mutation to pass "silently" through a multitude of generations because recessive genes remain 
unexpressed unless paired with another similar recessive gene. This mechanism is referred to as 
the founder effect. KELLY, supra note 42, at 76. 
48. See generally Marguerite A. Chapman, Canadian Experience with Predictive Testing for 
Huntington Disease: Lessons for Genetic Testing Centers and Policy Makers, 42 AM. J. MED. 
GENETICS 491 (1992); see infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
49. KELLY, supra note 42, at 36S-93. 
SO. Ray M. Antley, Genetic Counseling for Parents of a Baby with Down~Syndrome, in GE-
NETIC CoUNSELING: PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS llS, 123 (Seymour Kessler ed., 1979) 
[hereinafter PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS]; see also infra note 2S3. 
Sl. Antley, supra note SO, at 123. 
S2. Commonly screened-for diseases include PKU and hypothyroidism, for which treatment 
is available. See infra note 309 and accompanying text. Many states also screen for sickle cell 
anemia, although there is no cure. The justification, however, is that antibiotic prophylactic 
treatment can be given at a young age to help battle the recurrent infections to which children 
with sickle cell are prone. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
MANAGEMENT AND THERAPY OF SICKLE CELL DISEASE 1 (Samuel Charache et al. eds., 1984); 
McCabe, supra note 43, at 10. 
S3. Individuals with alpha-1-antitrypsin deficiency are especially prone to emphysema. 
Smoking and certain work environments exacerbate this risk. Andrews & Jaeger, supra note 7; 
at 76; P. Michael Conneally, The Genome Project and Confidentiality in the Clinical Setting, In 
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 28, at 
184, 188. 
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lated to the distinctive features of genetic data and the limits of tech-
nology. There is often uncertainty regarding how a disease will 
manifest because there can be great variability in gene expression. 
Some genetic diseases, like Tay-Sachs, have characteristic etiologies. 54 
Others range in severity. Prenatal studies indicating a fetus has 
neurofibromatosis, for example, cannot determine how severely the fe-
tus will be affected. ss 
Genetic testing can become complicated when it is impossible to 
identify directly the gene or its product. Although some disease genes 
are detected by a single test on the pro band, 56 testing for many genetic 
diseases requires linkage analysis: tracing DNA regions, or markers, 
near the disease locus to determine whether the same marker pattern 
in an affected family member is present in the proband. 57 Often af-
fected individuals in one family will have different marker patterns 
from those in affected individuals in other families. The marker asso-
ciated with the disease gene in a family is used to identify other carri-
ers in the family.58 This indirect method of testing only provides 
statistical probabilities that one does or does not carry the gene, leav-
ing results uncertain. s9 
54. See supra note 47. 
55. Current genetic technology cannot always predict when, or to what extent, genetic dis-
ease will manifest. Neurofibromatosis is an autosomal dominant disease with great variability in 
expression. It can cause severe cosmetic deformity and serious medical problems, such as in-
tracranial tumors, bone deformities, and neurofibromas (tumors of the nerve sheath) that de-
velop into malignancies. In contrast, many people with the disease only develop caf'e-au-lait 
spots (light brown pigmentation), nonmalignant neurofibromas, mild learning disabilities, or 
some combination thereof. See MEDICAL GENETICS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 
15, at 173; Skinner, supra note 18, at 98. 
56. Sickle cell anemia, PKU, and Tay Sachs are examples of genetic diseases for which carri-
ers can be identified on the basis of a single test in some families. The number of such diseases 
increases as scientists identify more mutations that cause disease. Cf. infra note 68, 70. 
57. This method has been used to detect the Huntington's gene, adult polycystic kidney dis-
ease, and breast cancer, among other disease genes. See James F. Gusella et al., A Polymorphic 
DNA Marker Genetically Linked to Huntington's Disease, 306 NATURE 234 (1983); Jeff M. Hall 
et al., Linkage of Early-Onset Familial Breast Cancer to Chromosome 17q21, 250 SCIENCE 1684 
(1990); Stephen T. Reeders et al., A Highly Polymorphic DNA Marker Linked to Adult Polycystic 
Kidney Disease on Chromosome 16, 317 NATURE 542 (1985); Stephen T. Reeders et al., Regional 
Localization of the Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease Locus, 3 GENOMICS 150 
(1988); Leslie Roberts, Zeroing In on a Breast Cancer Susceptibility Game, 259 SCIENCE 622 
(1993). 
58. Linkage studies are not useful for families when the marker patterns among different 
family members are indistinguishable and therefore uninformative. 
59. Cf. Ethics, Low, and the Human Genome, supra note 44. The proband may inherit the 
DNA marker pattern associated with the disease gene in her family. Because of biological cross-
ing-over, however, the proband may have received a chromosome from one parent in which the 
marker associated with the disease gene switched with the marker on the homologous chromo-
some. See MUIR, supra note 29, at 13-14; Jean-Marc Lalouel & Ray L. White, Analysis of Ge-
netic Linkage, in 1 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 149, 149-152. Consequently, 
the marker is no longer linked to the disease gene and its presence is erroneously interpreted as 
indicating that the proband has the disease gene. Unless the actual gene is sequenced to identify 
the mutation, it is virtually impossible to determine if crossing-over occurred. For example, 
because crossing-over between the Dl6S63 marker and the adult polycystic kidney gene occurs 
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Even for some diseases whose genetic bases have been identified, 
the study of an affected relative's DNA may be useful in determining 
which particular mutation exists in the family. If such a study is unin-
formative, linkage analysis may be required. 60 The necessary involve-
ment of certain family members in these instances can create some of 
the conflicts this Note discusses. 
D. Competing Interests in the Context of Genetic Testing 
Potential competing interests of family members further compli-
cate the process of genetic screening when linkage analysis or family 
studies are required. In these cases, one person's test results necessar-
ily have an impact on other family members; thus the genetic data of 
one relative are of great consequence to other relatives. Beyond the 
simple logistical problems in coordinating various family members to 
perform and explain linkage analysis and its implications, psychologi-
cal and interpersonal repercussions arise. Four hypotheticals illustrate 
the conflicting interests. 
1. Sarah's Case 
Imagine Sarah, whose brother and maternal uncle have X-linked 
Duchenne's muscular dystrophy (DMD). Based on her family his-
tory, she has a 50% chance of being a carrier for the disease. 61 In 
planning for future pregnancies or once she becomes pregnant, Sarah 
may decide she wants to learn whether she carries the disease gene. If 
she does, she has a one in two chance of having an affected son. 62 To 
four percent of the time, test results using this marker will be only 96% certain. Four percent of 
the time it will appear that a person does not carry the gene, even though she actually does carry 
it, or vice versa. G.G. Germino et al., Identification of a Locus Which Shows No Genetic Recom· 
bination with the Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease Gene on Chromosome 16, 46 
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 925, 926 (1990). The use of more than one marker, however, can in-
crease the probability of accuracy through linkage studies. See Kathy A. Hodgkinson et al., 
Adult Polycystic Kidney Disease: Knowledge, Experience, and Attitudes to Prenatal Diagnosis, 21 
J. MED. GENETICS 552, 552-53 (1990). Testing for polycystic kidney disease is further compli· 
cated by the fact that 4% of affected families do not appear to carry the gene that lies on chromo-
some 16. In other words, there may be a second gene in another part of the genome causing the 
disease. Patrick S. Parfey, The Diagnosis and Prognosis of Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kid-
ney Disease, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1085, 1085 (1990). 
60. Cystic fibrosis is an example of such a disease. Although the gene was discovered several 
years ago, see infra note 202, some families do not have any of the identified mutations. In those 
cases, linkage analysis can be used. See also infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
61. The odds are virtually 100% that her mother is a carrier, that is, that one of her X 
chromosomes has the disease gene. Consequently, Sarah has a 50% chance of having inherited 
the X-chromosome with the DMD gene from her mother; her other X chromosome came from 
her father, who does not carry the gene. 
62. On average, 50% of her children would be sons, 50% of whom would be affected because 
they would receive from her the X chromosome that carries the disease gene; the other 50% of 
her children would be unaffected daughters (although 50% of them would be carriers), assuming 
the father does not carry the gene. Therefore, of all possible combinations, 25% (or one in four) 
of her children would be affected males. 
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determine Sarah's risks, the ideal approach is to study her brother's 
DNA to identify his mutation.63 If, as is sometimes the case, his mu-
tation is not detectable, a single test on Sarah would be inconclusive. 64 
In that situation, it would be necessary to resort to linkage studies, 
which would involve her mother, father, and uncle. 
Asking Sarah's brother to undergo testing may raise difficulties. 
Depending on what her reproductive decisions would be, her brother 
may feel offended or hurt that she would consider terminating a preg-
nancy with an affected fetus. The existence of such an option implic-
itly suggests he might not have been born had such testing been 
available during his mother's pregnancy.65 
2. Bob's Case 
Complexities multiply when the family members required for ge-
netic studies do not yet know if they carry the gene in question. Such 
scenarios are most likely to arise with diseases that present late in life, 
such as Huntington's disease, polycystic kidney disease, or familial 
breast cancer. Huntington's disease creates particular difficulties. In 
addition to the physical deterioration it induces, psychological distur-
bances and mental decline66 increase the anxiety of genetic testing be-
cause of the potential knowledge that both health and mental well-
being may be lost. 67 The need to use linkage analysis further compli-
cates Huntington's testing because it only provides probabilities of car-
rier status68 and therefore increases uneasiness. 
63. If the brother cannot or will not participate, studies on Sarah are likely to be inconclu-
sive. If testing reveals no detectable mutation, this does not mean that she does not carry the 
gene. It is possible that the gene in her family is not detectable without linkage analysis. 
64. The absence of a mutation in this case could mean that Sarah did not carry the disease 
gene or that she carried the gene, but, as with her brother, it cannot be detected. 
65. This Note's author confronted this situation in providing genetic counseling for a woman 
whose brother had DMD, and who participated in both the counseling and genetic testing. 
66. The disease causes progressive motor abnormalities, mental impairment, and often cho-
rea. Gusella et al., supra note 57, at 234. 
67. See, generally, Maurice Bloch et al., Predictive Testing for Huntington Disease in Canada: 
The Experience of Those Receiving an Increased Risk, 42 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 499 (1992); 
Chapman, supra note 48, at 491; Huggins et al., supra note 36, at 508. 
68. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Just before publication of this Note, after a 
frustrating ten-year struggle, scientists discovered the gene for Huntington's. The Huntington's 
Disease Collaborative Research Group, A Novel Gene Containing Trinucleotide Repeat That is 
Expanded and Unstable on Huntington's Disease Chromosomes, 72 CELL 971 (1993); Natalie 
Angier, Team Pinpoints Genetic Cause of Huntington's, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at Al. The 
implications of this discovery are not yet certain. The isolated gene carries a repeated sequence 
of DNA - a polymorphic trinucleotide repeat - that varies in length. Initial studies suggest 
that the length of the repeat is inversely correlated with the age of onset; that is, shorter repeats 
are associated with later ages of onset. The Huntington's Disease Collaborative Research Group, 
supra, at 972. The research also suggests that if the repeat length is greater than or equal to a 
certain threshold level, an individual has the disease gene. See id. at 976. More detailed studies 
will be necessary before the repeat sequence can be used for the prognosis of at-risk individuals, 
although it is expected that the new discovery will eliminate the need to use linkage analysis for 
Huntington's. Id. at 980. Until that time, however, linkage analysis will still be required for 
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All of these factors make genetic testing more complex than many 
other medical tests. Imagine Bob, whose paternal grandfather has 
been diagnosed with Huntington's. Without additional information, 
Bob has a 25% chance of carrying the gene and eventually developing 
symptoms. 69 If Bob wants to determine whether he has the gene, 
either to plan a family or to make other major life decisions, he will 
need to involve his grandfather and father in genetic studies. 70 Many 
people at risk for Huntington's, however, do not want to know 
whether they have the gene, 71 especially because there is no cure. 
Consequently, Bob's father might be unwilling to participate in a fam-
ily study. 72 The situation creates a clear conflict of interests and dem-
onstrates how genetic data affect persons other than the proband. 
Situations such as Bob's raise the issue of whose interest should prevail 
and whether the law should compel genetic screening for the benefit of 
another: that is, whether Bob's father should be required to undergo 
testing so that Bob can make reproductive or other decisions. 
3. Mary's Case 
A related issue involving disclosure arises once an individual has 
Huntington's families. When linkage analysis becomes unnecessary for the identification of the 
Huntington's gene, family studies may sometimes be necessary to compare the repeat lengths of 
various family members. Even if the need to involve family members becomes obsolete for Hunt· 
ington's testing, linkage analysis or other studies that require the testing of family members re-
main necessary for the testing of a number of other genetic diseases, such as adult polycystic 
kidney disease and familial breast cancer. See supra notes 57 & 59 and accompanying text. 
69. Bob's father has a 50% chance of having inherited the gene from his father. If he did, 
there would have been a 50% chance of passing the gene to Bob. In total, Bob's risk is 25% 
because the probabilities are multiplied. Of course, after testing, Bob will face a dramatically 
higher or lower risk depending on the result of linkage studies. 
70. If linkage studies are necessary for Bob, it might also be necessary to test his mother to 
help determine which chromosomes Bob inherited from each parent. See Conneally, supra note 
53, at 193-94. Linkage analysis has been used, and may continue to be used for some families, for 
presymptomatic Huntington's testing. See supra note 68. Because so many studies have ad-
dressed the issues regarding genetic testing generally, and presymptomatic testing in particular, 
in the Huntington's context, see, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 36-39, infra note 71 and 
accompanying text, Huntington's provides the best illustration of the complexities that often 
arise with genetic testing. Consequently, despite the discovery of the Huntington's gene and the 
possibility that, in the foreseeable future, Huntington's may no longer present the problems de-
scribed in this Note, the Huntington's example remains the best way to illustrate the issues this 
Note discusses. Therefore, this Note is written as if linkage analysis were still necessary for Bob 
to learn whether he has Huntington's. These issues apply equally well to genetic testing for 
diseases such as adult polycystic kidney disease and breast cancer. See supra note 68. 
71. Before linkage studies were available, 70% of people at risk for Huntington's stated that 
they would use predictive testing. Yet, once the test became available, only 13% took advantage 
of it. Conneally, supra note 53, at 193. 
72. Linkage analysis would require determining the Huntington's status of Bob's father, even 
before Bob's is determined. Even if the test results were not revealed to his father, it is likely that 
on the basis of decisions that Bob did or did not make, his father could infer whether Bob was a 
likely carrier or noncarrier. If Bob were a carrier, his father would necessarily also be a carrier. 
If Bob were not a carrier, however, his father may or may not be a carrier. Bob might not be a 
carrier either because his father did not pass the gene to Bob or because his father did not have 
the gene in the first place. 
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been tested. Suppose that Mary has a daughter with primary amenor-
rhea, meaning that she has not begun her menstrual cycle. Tests indi-
cate her daughter has complete testicular feminization, a syndrome in 
which a female with normal external female genitalia has a 46,XY kar-
yotype, the male pattern of chromosomes, rather than the female 
46,XX karyotype. As a result, the internal genitalia are absent with 
the exception of undescended testes, which can become malignant if 
not removed. 73 Females with testicular feminization syndrome {TFS) 
are genetically male and cannot reproduce. Yet, because there is com-
plete resistance to testosterone, they develop as females in outward 
appearance.74 The pattern of inheritance is X-linked recessive. There-
fore, Mary is a likely carrier of the TFS gene.75 If the gene had passed 
silently through the family and was inherited by Mary, who would be 
a carrier, there is a 50% chance that her daughters and sisters without 
the syndrome are also carriers with a 25% chance of having an af-
flicted child. 76 Because of the social stigma associated with this syn-
drome, 77 Mary may refuse to inform her sisters of the risk to their 
daughters, even though removal of inguinal testes could prevent ma-
lignancies. Some might argue that Mary has a moral or legal duty to 
inform her sisters, the nieces who are potentially affected, and more 
distant relatives of their genetic risks. In addition, the genetic coun-
selor or physician faces the dilemma of possible conflicting duties. In 
such cases, a duty to maintain patient confidentiality may clash with a 
duty to protect third parties, namely, the at-risk relatives.78 
4. Jane's Case 
The issues raised by testicular feminization overlap with those 
presented by genetic diseases that carry less social stigma but that have 
more serious medical consequences. Many genetic diseases fall into 
this category. Consider Jane, for example, who is found to have a 
balanced chromosomal rearrangement79 after having had multiple 
miscarriages and a child with severe and multiple birth defects. She is 
73. Joe L. Simpson, Disorders of Gonads and Internal Reproductive Ducts, in 2 PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 1593, 1601. 
74. See id. 
75. An exception would occur if a new mutation in Mary's daughter caused the syndrome. 
In that case, Mary would not be a carrier. 
76. The 25% risk is based on the 50% probability of a carrier passing the gene to a child, 
multiplied by a 50% risk that the child will have an 46,XY karyotype and will therefore be 
affected. See supra note 62 for more details regarding the inheritance of X-linked disorders. 
77. See infra note 154. 
78. See infra Part II. 
79. A chromosomal rearrangement occurs when part or all of a chromosome trades positions 
with part or all of another chromosome. A balanced rearrangement results in no loss or gain of 
chromosomal material. Conversely, an unbalanced rearrangement causes the individual to have 
an excessive amount of some chromosomal material, a paucity of some chromosomal material, or 
both. See HARPER, supra note 13, at 56-69. 
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healthy because she has the proper amount of genetic material, but her 
chromosomes are rearranged in such a way that her offspring may 
inherit excessive quantities of some chromosomal material, deficient 
quantities of other chromosomal material, or both, resulting in miscar-
riage, stillbirth, or severe and multiple birth defects. 8° Chromosomal 
rearrangements or translocations can arise de novo - as a new event 
- or be inherited.st 
Jane's relatives are therefore potentially at risk for carrying the re-
arrangement and having children with severe and multiple birth de-
fects. Relatives who learn they have the rearrangement may wish to 
receive genetic counseling to explore their reproductive options. One 
alternative is prenatal testing, with the option to terminate pregnancies 
in which the fetus has an unbalanced rearrangement. 82 Others are 
ovum or sperm donation, adoption, or acceptance of the risks. 83 In 
other families, the genes for single gene disorders may be found unex-
pectedly, though siblings and more distant relatives are completely un-
aware of their potential risks. 84 These cases raise questions regarding 
the duties of the identified carrier and health care professionals to rela-
tives who have no knowledge of their genetic risk. 
Relatives may want the information not just for reproductive deci-
sions, but also for other major choices, such as whether to get married 
or what career to choose. These decisions are more likely to be influ-
enced by finding out whether one carries a dominant gene for a late-
onset disease, as opposed to a recessive disease gene. Someone at risk 
for Huntington's, myotonic dystrophy, or other genetic diseases affect-
ing neurological function might avoid professions that require honed 
motor skills such as neurosurgery or aviation. More importantly, ge-
netic information can sometimes give one the opportunity to use pre-
ventive measures to lessen or prevent morbidity or mortality, even 
when no cure is available. 85 If a child carries the gene for retinoblas-
toma, he has a 95% chance of developing cancer of the eye by the age 
of five. Regular examinations every four to six weeks, however, allow 
80. See id; MUIR, siJpra note 29, at 195. One can have both an excessive amount of material 
with respect to one chromosome and a deficient amount of material with respect to another 
chromosome. 
81. See Stanbury et al., supra note 16, at 13. 
82. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
83. KELLY, supra note 42, at 353-55; Y. Edward Hsia & Kurt Hirschhorn, Response to Ge-
netic Counseling, in COUNSELING IN GENETICS, supra, at 267, 270; Y. Edward Hsia & Kurt 
Hirschhorn, What is Genetic Counseling?, in COUNSELING IN GENETICS 1, 18 (Y. Edward Hsia 
et al. eds., 1979). 
84. Many genetic diseases such as Tay-Sachs and sickle cell anemia are known to be most 
common among certain ethnic groups. See supra note 47. Geneticists would offer appropriate 
genetic testing for individuals in the relevant ethnic groups even when there is no family history 
of the disease. There are instances, however, when a disease gene is identified in an individual 
who had no prior indication of risk factors. 
85. The availability of such measures, however, is by no means the norm for genetic diseases 
yet. 
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physicians to detect and successfully treat lesions, which can bring 
survival close to 100%. 86 Thus relatives can avoid an untimely death 
by discovering their risks and using preventive measures. 
Genetic testing, as evidenced by the scenarios above, poses special 
problems with regard to who has a right to genetic information. Indi-
vidual interests can conflict: the desire to ki-iow versus the desire not 
to know, and the right to confidentiality versus the right to be warned. 
Conflicts need not necessarily arise, however. 87 If Bob's father were 
willing to be tested or if Mary and Jane informed their at-risk rela-
tives, such issues would never develop. When family interests clash, 
however, these cases raise significant issues. This Note explores how 
the legal system should resolve such conflicts by asking two related 
questions. First, should test results be released to those who are po-
tentially at risk and who can benefit from the information, as in 
Mary's and Jane's cases? Second, should the law ever compel testing 
for the benefit of another, as in Bob's case? 
II. DISCLOSURE OF GENETIC TEST RESULTS 
This Part addresses whether and, under what circumstances, there 
is a legal right or ethical obligation to disclose genetic test results to a 
relative when individuals have already undergone genetic testing. 88 
These individuals have decided they want to know whether they carry 
a disease gene or chromosomal translocation, or they have learned 
that they are likely carriers because they have affected children. Such 
situations present a conflict between one's right to confidentiality in 
the ethically and legally protected patient-physician relationship and 
the physician's legal duty to warn certain third parties of known risks. 
· These conflicts arise, for example, when Mary finds out that her 
daughter has complete tes~cular feminization syndrome or when Jane 
discovers she has a chromosomal rearrangement that can be inherited 
in such a way that the offspring has severe birth defects and mental 
impairment. 89 In both cases, family members are at risk, either for 
86. Leslie Roberts, Testing for Cancer Risk: Tough Questions Ahead, 253 SCIENCE 614 
(1991). Similarly, prophylactic colectomies can be performed on individuals who have a history 
of Gardner's syndrome, an autosomal dominant precancerous syndrome, if they have clinical 
features of the disease and polyposis of the colon. H.T. Lynch et al., Genetic Counseling and 
Cancer, in PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 50, at 221, 233-34. 
87. In fact, in the experience of this Note's author, conflicts are far rarer than familial 
cooperation. 
88. This Part is'primarily concerned with the situation in which an individual has already 
learned whether she carries a particular disease gene. It should be recognized that a patient's 
interests in nondisclosure also arise when mandatory testing is at issue because such testing 
would not be useful unless the results were disclosed. Compulsory testing, however, also involves 
significant interests of personal identity and bodily integrity above and beyond a patient's inter-
ests in avoiding disclosure of information already in existence and known to the patient. Part III, 
infra, discusses these interests. 
89. See supra subsections I.D.3 and I.D.4. Such conflict may also arise when one is diag-
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being affected with the syndrome, like Mary's sister's daughters, or for 
having children with serious health problems, like Jane's siblings and 
cousins. Informing the family members of their risks would allow 
them to decide whether to have genetic testing. 
This Part analyzes what legal duties the physician or genetic coun-
selor owes to the family members and what legal duties Mary and Jane 
have to their family. Section II.A examines the conflicting common 
law duties a physician has both to protect patient confidentiality and 
to inform third parties at risk. Section II.B considers how the balance-
of-interests approach adopted by courts applies to genetic testing. It 
concludes that, while physicians and genetic counselors should some-
times have a privilege to warn, they should never have a duty to do so. 
Finally, section II.C argues that, while an individual has a moral duty 
to inform at-risk relatives, no such legal duty exists. 
A. The Physician's Conflicting Duties 
The conflict between the physician's legal duties to preserve confi-
dentiality and to warn third parties is not new. Courts, scholars, and 
medical practitioners have addressed these issues with regard to conta-
gious diseases including, most recently, AIDS.90 The conflicting du-
ties arise from ethical standards within the medical profession, the 
common law, and statutory requirements in some states. This section 
explores the ethical and legal grounds justifying the legal duty to pre-
serve confidentiality. It considers the limits of this duty - when the 
duty to protect third parties creates a privilege to breach confidential-
ity in good faith. Finally, it examines cases in which courts have 
found not just a privilege, but a legal duty, to warn. 
1. Duties to Preserve Confidentiality 
The legal duty to preserve confidentiality emerges from a long his-
tory of ethical and legal principles. This section explores the ethical 
and legal origins of this legal duty. In addition, it argues that the duty 
nosed with a genetic disease, but in this case, the diagnosis is harder to keep hidden from rela· 
tives than the finding that one is an asymptomatic or presymptomatic carrier. 
90. See, e.g., Bruce A. McDonald, Ethical Problems for Physicians Raised by AIDS and HIV 
Infection: Conflicting Legal Obligations of Confidentiality and Disclosure, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REv. 557; David P.T. Price, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Charting a Course to Reconcile the 
Duty of Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn in the AIDS Context, 94 DICK. L. REV. 435 (1990); 
Michael B. McVickar, Note, To Disclose or Not To Disclose the Presence of AIDS: Resolving the 
Confidentiality Concerns of Patients, Physicians, and Third Parties, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 341 
(1989); Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: AIDS and the 
Conflicting Physician's Duties of Preventing Disease Transmission and Safeguarding Confidential· 
ity, 76 GEO. L.J. 169 (1987); Jill S. Talbot, Note, The Conflict Between a Doctor's Duty to Warn a 
Patient's Sexual Partner that the Patient Has AIDS and a Doctor's Duty to Maintain Patient 
Confidentiality, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 355 (1988); Charles D. Weiss, Comment, AIDS: Bal· 
ancing the Physician's Duty to Warn and Confidentiality Concerns, 38 EMORY L.J. 279 (1989). 
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is not absolute; sometimes important concerns override the duty and 
create a privilege to reveal otherwise confidential information. 
a. Ethical Duty To Preserve Confidentiality. The ethical duty 
to maintain confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship ex-
tends as far back as the Hippocratic Oath.91 Under this oath a physi-
cian promises not to divulge whatever " 'ought not to be spoken of 
abroad.' " 92 The American Medical Association reinforces this moral 
obligation by prohibiting physicians from revealing patient informa-
tion unless "required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in 
order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community."93 
Thus there is an ethical duty for physicians not to disclose information 
obtained in their capacity as medical professionals. 
b. Legal Duty To Preserve Confidentiality. Although some 
courts fail to recognize any legal duty to preserve patient confidential-
ity,94 most states require physicians to maintain patient confidentiality 
under a number of theories. 95 Courts do not rely on the ethical duty 
alone as a basis for finding a corresponding legal duty, although such 
principles inform many courts' reasoning.96 One basis of a legal obli-
gation evolves from statutes relating to testimonial privileges or licens-
ing requirements.97 Among the earliest cases to apply such principles 
is Simonsen v. Swenson. 98 The Nebraska Supreme Court derived a 
legal duty from a licensing statute, which authorized the revocation of 
medical licenses when a physician" 'betray[ed] ... a professional se-
cret to the detriment of a patient.' " 99 The court viewed this statute as 
91. Harold P. Green & Alexander M. Capron, Issues of Law and Public Policy in Genetic 
Screening. in ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 21, at 57, 62; McVickar, 
supra note 90, at 348; Weiss, supra note 90, at 286. 
92. Oath of Hippocrates, 400 B.C., quoted in Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 829 (Ala. 
1973) (plurality opinion), and quoted in Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 347 (N.J. 1962). 
93. AMERICAN MEDICAL AssN., PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957), quoted in 
Horne, 287 So. 2d at 829, and quoted in Hague, 181 A.2d at 347. 
94. In Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Ga. 1957), the United States District Court 
did not find such a duty under statutory or common law in Georgia. Consequently, the physi-
cian's and hospital's disclosure of the plaintiff's blood test results to the plaintiff's employer was 
not grounds for recovery. Applying similar reasoning, the Supreme Court of Tennessee found 
that there was neither common law nor statutory protection of patient confidentiality in the 
doctor-patient relationship. Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. 1965). Therefore, the 
physician breached no duty in disclosing the patient's medical information to the store where the 
patient was injured and against whom the patient brought suit. 
95. See infra text accompanying notes 96-108. 
96. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d at 828-29 (plurality opinion); Hague v. Williams 
181 A.2d at 345; Clark v. Geraci, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
97. Munzer v. Blaisdell, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944) affd. mem., 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. 
Div. 1945); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 534-35 (Or. 1985). 
98. 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920) (per curiam). 
99. 177 N.W. at 832 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 2721 (1913)). 
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evidence of a public policy interest in treating the patient-physician 
relationship as highly confidential. 
Even when a state has no such statute, courts have found a legal 
basis to protect patient confidentiality. Some courts apply implied 
contract theory to find liability for breach of confidentiality.100 Still 
others find more than a contractual relationship between the patient 
and physician. The Supreme Court of Oregon, in Humphers v. First 
Interstate Bank, 101 held the physician to a nonconsensual duty of con-
fidentiality, which "is determined by standards outside the tort claim 
for its breach."to2 
Courts disagree, however, whether the duty not to disclose can be 
based on a tort claim for invasion of privacy.103 One court asserted 
that "the preservation of the patient's privacy is no mere ethical duty 
upon the part of the doctor; there is a legal duty as well."104 Another 
court distinguished between secrets and confidentiality.105 Thus one 
who divulges information "without an obligation of secrecy" commits 
no tort. 106 Because the patient-physician relationship is founded on 
confidentiality, however, the court imposed a duty to protect informa-
tion obtained through the relationship.107 
Consequently, where states have licensing or testimonial privilege 
statutes, courts can easily find that the statutes express a policy of pro-
tecting patient-physician confidentiality. In the absence of such laws, 
theories of implied contract and the confidential or fiduciary nature of 
the relationship108 generally suffice to impose a duty to protect patient 
information. 
c. Privilege To Disclose. Virtually all courts that impose a duty 
to preserve patient confidentiality describe it as nonabsolute.109 One 
100. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973), identi· 
fled an implied contractual duty not to disclose patient information as one of several legal justifi· 
cations for protecting patient confidentiality. 287 So. 2d at 831-32 (plurality opinion); see also 
Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
101. 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985). 
102. 696 P.2d at 535. 
103. See Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Physician's Tort Liability far Unauthorized Disclosure of 
Confidential Information About Patient, 48 A.L.R.4TH 668, 681-83 (1986 & Supp. 1992). 
104. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801-02 (N.D. Ohio 1965). 
105. Humphers, 696 P.2d at 528. 
106. 696 P.2d at 533. 
107. 696 P.2d at 535. 
108. See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965) 
("[P]hysician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one," which requires the physician to protect the 
patient's divulgences.); Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962) (per 
curiam) ("[M]embers of a profession, especially the medical profession, stand in a confidential or 
fiduciary capacity as to their patients."); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1958) (The 
doctor-patient relationship "is among those with respect to which it is the policy of the law to 
encourage confidence."). 
109. The Supreme Court of Alabama notes that the "duty is subject to exceptions prompted 
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of the most common justifications for a privilege to disclose is to pro-
tect public health. The Simonsen court found that physicians have a 
"positive duty" to protect the privacy of their patients. It reasoned, 
however, that physicians should not be liable for disclosing informa-
tion when "necessary to prevent the spread of ... disease," even if 
there is no "express legal enactment" imposing a duty to report. 110 
Therefore, when the patient failed to leave a hotel after the doctor 
urged him to do so for the well-being of other guests, the physician 
was not liable for informing the hotel's proprietress of the patient's 
infectious, syphilitic state. The physician was immune from liability 
for disclosure because he acted in good faith, without malice, and did 
not disclose more information than was necessary .111 
Courts have also upheld disclosure to certain family members. A 
Louisiana court in the 1960s supported disclosure of patient informa-
tion to a husband, reasoning that :tie, as head of the household, had a 
right to his wife's medical information, even though the couple lived 
apart. 112 The Supreme Court of Utah, in Berry v. Moench, 113 extended 
the privilege to disclose to potential spouses. It argued that "the re-
sponsibility of the doctor to keep confidence may be outweighed by a 
higher duty to give out information, even though defamatory, if there 
is a sufficiently important interest to protect."114 The court did not 
define the limits of this privilege but noted it might apply "[w]here life, 
safety, well-being or other important interest is in jeopardy."115 Con-
sequently, the court remanded to detemiine whether the physician in-
tentionally stated a falsehood without legal justification by informing 
the family of the patient's fiancee that he believed the patient was men-
tally ill.116 The ruling implies that the well-being of one's fiancee may 
justify disclosure of patient information, as long as the doctor makes a 
"good faith" effort to ensure that the disclosure is truthful and to di-
by the supervening interests of society, as well as the private interests of the patient himself." 
Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 830 (Ala. 1973) (plurality opinion). The New Jersey Supreme 
Court defines the patient right to confidentiality with almost identical language, adding only that 
exceptions apply when "the public interest ••. so demands." Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 
349 (N.J. 1962). The Supreme Court of Oregon, stressing similar principles, argues that "there 
may be a privilege to disclose information for the safety of individuals or important to the public 
in matters of public interest." Humphers, 696 P.2d at 535 (citing Alan v. Vickery, Note, Breach 
of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 1426, 1462-68 (1982)). 
110. Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920) (per curiam). 
111. 177 N.W. at 833. 
112. Pennison v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617 (La. Ct. App.}, cert. 
denied, 156 So. 2d 226 (La. 1963). Courts have even justified disclosure of information expected 
to be used in affidavits for divorce proceedings under the theory that there is a privilege to dis-
close medical information to spouses, or at least husbands. Curry v. Com, 277 N.Y.S.2d 470 
(Sup. Ct. 1966) (mem.). 
113. 331 P.2d 814 (Utah 1958). 
114. 331 P.2d at 817. 
115. 331 P.2d at 817. 
116. 331 P.2d at 820-21. 
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vulge only what is necessary to those who need the information.117 
Based on these decisions, courts might find there is a privilege to warn 
when harm can be prevented, even if the harm does not involve life or 
death. 
2. Duty to Warn 
The recognition that physicians may be immune from liability for 
disclosure is related to, but distinct from, the duty to warn. The latter 
duty first arose in the contagious disease context without confronting 
the duty to preserve confidentiality. In Skillings v. Allen, 118 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court found that a physician who treated a girl for 
scarlet fever had a special duty to advise her parents of the risks they 
faced in caring for their infectious daughter. 119 Similarly, in Arkan-
sas, physicians who treated patients for typhoid fever failed to advise 
third parties that typhoid is infectious and neglected to tell them how 
to avoid contracting the disease. The Supreme Court of Arkansas 
consequently found that the physicians breached their duty to the 
third parties "who [were] ignorant of such disease, and who ... [were] 
liable to be brought in contact with the patient."120 These cases follow 
earlier decisions imposing liability on physicians for failing to warn 
third parties of their risks of contracting contagious diseases. 121 
Because the plaintiffs knew the patients were ill, these cases do not 
involve the dilemma in which a physician must breach confidentiality 
in order to warn. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 122 
however, dealt with this issue when it extended the duty to warn into 
the arena of psychotherapy. The Supreme Court of California found a 
117. 331 P.2d at 818-19. The Supreme Court of New Jersey described the Berry court's 
position even more strongly, stating that it was the Utah court's "opinion that the happiness and 
well-being of the young lady were interests sufficient to warrant such a disclosure." Hague v. 
Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 348 (N.J. 1962). 
118. 173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919). 
119. 173 N.W. at 663-64. 
120. Davis v. Rodman, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (Ark. 1921). Despite the existence and breach of 
such a duty, the defendants were not held liable because of the absence of proximate cause. 227 
S.W. at 615. 
121. See Piper v. Menifee, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 465 (1851) (physician found liable for treat-
ing smallpox patients and failing to warn subsequent patient-plaintiff of the risk of transmission 
of disease; consequently plaintiff developed smallpox); Hewett v. Woman's Hosp. Aid Assn., 64 
A. 190 (N.H. 1906) (finding liability for hospital's failure to warn a nursing student that her 
patient had diphtheria and was contagious, which resulted in the nurse's illness); Edwards v. 
Lamb, 45 A. 480 (N.H. 1899) (finding a physician liable for telling wife of patient that there was 
no danger in dressing her husband's infectious wound; as a result, wife became infected); Span v. 
Ely, 15 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (8 Hun) 255 (1876) (finding the doctor liable for assuring plaintiff, who 
contracted smallpox, that whitewashing house in which a previous patient died of smallpox was 
safe); see also Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied, 245 
So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971) (duty to protect the minor child of physician's patient); Jones v. Stanko, 
160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928) (duty to the neighbors of physician's patient who attended patient 
while ill and who aided in the patient's burial). 
122. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en bane). 
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valid cause of action in the claim that the defendant therapists 
breached their duty of care by failing to warn the plaintiff's daughter 
of the danger she faced from the therapists' patient.123 In fact, the 
patient killed the plaintiff's daughter after he told the therapists he 
intended to murder her. 
The Tarasojf court derived the duty to warn from the common law 
exception to the rule that one only has a duty to control or warn of the 
conduct of another if there is a special relationship between the actor 
and the dangerous person or between the actor and the victim. The 
requisite special relationship was found because the dangerous person 
was the therapists' patient. 124 The court argued that the balance of 
interests weighs in favor of protecting endangered life, even when 
there is a risk of harming the patient by disclosure or by inaccurately 
predicting violent tendencies. It found support from the American 
Medical Association, which allows breaches of confidence when 
" 'necessary ... to protect the welfare of the individual or of the com-
munity.' "125 The duty to warn was limited in California by Thomp-
son v. County of Alameda, 126 which held physicians to such a duty 
only if there is an identifiable victim. A few jurisdictions, however, 
have extended the duty to warn beyond a known or identifiable 
victim.127 
Most courts would agree that interests in protecting the public or 
certain third parties can outweigh the duty to preserve confidentiality, 
although they might disagree over where to draw the line. Neverthe-
less many share the view that the "supervening interests" of society 
include preventing the spread of communicable diseases. 128 Based on 
Tarasoff and jurisdictions that apply similar reasoning, 129 the law may 
sometimes require a physician to warn - especially when there is an 
identifiable victim and a special relation between the physician and 
123. 551 P.2d at 353. 
124. Although prior California decisions applied such a duty only when there was a special 
relationship with both the victim and the dangerous person, this court determined that the duty 
to control another or warn of another's behavior was not limited to those scenarios. In this 
instance the court held that as long as either the victim or perpetuator has a special relationship 
with the defendant, there is a duty to warn. 551 P.2d at 343-44. 
125. AMERICAN MEDICAL AssN., supra note 93, § 9, quoted in 551 P.2d at 347. 
126. 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980) (en bane). 
127. See Kenneth E. Labowitz, Beyond Tarasoff: AIDS and the Obligation to Breach Confi-
dentiality, 9 ST. Louis U. Pua. L. REV. 495, 502 n.11 (1990) (citing cases). Davis v. Rodman, 
227 S.W. 612 (Ark. 1921), for example, imposed a duty on physicians to warn even though third 
parties may not have been known. Labowitz, supra at 503-04. In such cases the duty presuma-
bly requires that physicians attempt to identify potential victims. 
128. See supra note 109; see also Clark v. Geraci, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (Sup. Ct. 1960) 
(when disclosure has "risen to the level of a need to safeguard the security of the government or 
the safety of the public, as in a case of a disclosure of a communicable disease ... it would ... be 
quite simple to find that the doctor's duty to disclose overrode his duty to remain silent"). 
129. See Piorkowski, supra note 90, at 184 n.81. 
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victim or potential harmer - even if it requires breaching 
confidentiality. 
In the context of warning sexual or needle-sharing partners of a 
patient infected with HIV, commentators and legislatures disagree 
about how to apply the common law, that is, whether there should be 
a duty to warn, or just immunity from liability in warning, partners of 
a person infected with HIV. 130 State legislatures have addressed this 
issue variously by providing immunity without imposing a duty to 
warn, 131 by imposing a duty to warn, 132 or just by imposing a duty to 
maintain confidentiality unless a court finds there is a compelling need 
for disclosure.133 
Unlike warning third parties that smallpox or typhoid fever is con-
tagious, warning third parties of the patient's HIV-positive status can 
reveal very confidential information. Society does not deal with AIDS 
like other infectious diseases that befall the unlucky; AIDS carries a 
social stigma.134 Some view AIDS as just deserts for "immoral" be-
havior.135 Because of public perceptions of AIDS, an HIV-positive 
test result or AIDS diagnosis may be viewed as indicative of homosex-
uality, illicit drug use, or sexual promiscuity. Consequently, people 
fear that disclosure in the AIDS context can result not only in the loss 
of insurance or employment, but also in the loss of social status, sup-
port from family and friends, and equal treatment in society.136 More-
over, AIDS relates directly to sexuality because of its mode of 
transmission; revelations thus implicate deep personal privacy inter-
ests regardless of stigma from the disease itself. 
Another distinction between AIDS and many other contagious dis-
eases is their "visibility." Many HIV-positive individuals are generally 
unidentifiable, whereas someone with typhoid or scarlet fever is quite 
obviously ill, even if the specific diagnosis is not known. Therefore, 
those exposed to possible infection by a person with HIV are less likely 
130. See Labowitz, supra note 127; McVickar, supra note 90. 
131. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-584 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101 (Supp. 
1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6004 (1992); Mo. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-337 (1990); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 23-6-17 (Supp. 1992). 
132. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS§ 333.5114a (1991). 
133. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1203 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ch. 381.004(3)(f) 
(1991). 
134. See COMM. ON AIDS REsEARCH & THE BEHAVIORAL, SOCIAL & STATISTICAL SCI-
ENCES, NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, Prevention: The Continuing Challenge, in AIDS: THE 
SECOND DECADE, 81, 116 (Heather G. Miller et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter Prevention]. 
135. See, e.g. AIDS: When Fear Takes Charge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 12, 1987, at 
68; cf. Adam Nossiter, Some Legal Experts See Intolerance as H.L V. and Sex Are Linked to 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1992, at A7 (suggesting that conviction could reveal society's intol-
erance towards AIDS). 
136. See Prevention, supra note 134, at 115; COMM. ON AIDS RESEARCH & THE BEHAV· 
!ORAL, SOCIAL & STATISTICAL SCIENCES, NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, Social Barriers to 
AIDS Prevention, in AIDS: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND INTRAVENOUS DRUG USE 372, 391·94 
(Charles F. Turner et al. eds., 1989); AIDS: When Fear Takes Charge, supra note 135, at 65. 
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to be aware of their risk than someone exposed to a person with scarlet 
fever. The problems with identifiability apply in the genetics context 
as well, where most unaffected carriers show no evidence of carrying a 
disease gene. Many who defend the overriding duty to warn, even 
when confidentiality is breached, would argue that this duty is limited 
in the AIDS context only to identifiable victims.137 These complica-
tions are part of the dilemma physicians face in their conflicting duties 
to preserve confidentiality and to warn, and they provide useful insight 
into the similar problems and competing interests that exist in the ge-
netics context. It is unclear how far the duty to warn extends with 
regard to AIDS, other contagious diseases, or psychiatric patients. 
Nevertheless, most jurisdictions would find a duty to warn if the phy-
sician has a special relationship with the potential victim or person 
who may cause harm and if the potential victim is identifiable and the 
harm to the victim is foreseeable. 
B. A Conditional Privilege But No Duty to Warn 
This section applies a policy analysis to argue that there should be 
a conditional privilege to warn in the genetics context under certain 
circumstances. Subsection II.B.1 argues that genetic disease may af-
fect identifiable victims, although the more distantly related the at-risk 
relative, the less closely she fits this description. Subsection II.B.2 ar-
gues that legal principles support a conditional privilege to inform 
identifiable relatives, although such a privilege should arise only when 
the harm from failure to disclose outweighs the harm of disclosure. 
This subsection concludes that, despite the existence of a privilege to 
warn in the genetics context, health care professionals should be under 
no duty to warn. 
1. The ''Identifiable" Victim 
The duty to warn requires a special relationship between the physi-
cian and the potential victim or harmer. In the genetics context, the 
patient and geneticist have such a special relationship, just as the ther-
apists and the assailant did in Tarasoff. The Tarasoff court further 
limited the duty to warn to identifiable victims. Because genetic dis-
eases can only be transmitted vertically - from parent to child -
137. See Labowitz, supra note 127, at 501-02; McVickar, supra note 90, at 365-66; see also 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 199.19-199.29 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (prohibiting negli-
gent and wilful disclosure of test results, with the exceptions of disclosure to health care provid-
ers, spouse, sexual partner, and needle-sharer); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE §§ 199.30-199.44 
(West 1990) (protecting confidentiality of AIDS test information, but allowing disclosure of re-
sults without consent when necessary for a medical emergency; penalizing wilful or malicious 
disclosure oftest information); N.Y. Pua. HEALTH LAW§§ 2782-2783 (McKinney Supp. 1992) 
(allowing, without obligating, physicians to disclose results to sexual or needle-sharing partners if 
they believe HIV-positive people will not inform their partners after being told of the intent to 
inform). 
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certain relatives who are potentially affected by an individual's diagno-
sis of genetic disease or identification as a disease gene carrier may be 
identifiable victims.13s 
Mary, whose daughter has TFS, for example, has sisters who are 
potential carriers for this disease. 139 Leaming about the possible fa-
milial gene may strongly affect their lives. Similarly, Jane's siblings 
could be carriers for the chromosomal translocation. There are other 
"identifiable" people: Mary's nieces on her sisters' side are at risk for 
being affected by, or being carriers of, TFS; her mother's sisters and 
their daughters have similar risks, as do her grandmother's daughters 
and sisters. Jane's aunts, uncles, and cousins are also at some risk for 
carrying the translocation. 140 The more distantly related one is to a 
carrier, however, the fewer the shared genes and the lower the risk of 
carrying the same disease gene or chromosomal rearrangement. 141 
Jane's siblings, for example, have a greater chance of carrying the 
translocation than her cousins twice removed.142 Statistically, the peo-
ple most likely to benefit from information regarding genetic test re-
sults are those most closely related to the proband. Thus the 
"identifiable victim" becomes increasingly remote as the family tree 
extends. · 
Despite the identifiability of certain relatives, the physician or 
counselor should not necessarily have a legal duty to warn a patient's 
first- or second-degree143 relatives, let alone those who are more dis-
tantly related. The interests in warning the relatives must be balanced 
against the interests of the patient, as subsection II.B.2 argues. Thus 
such a balancing test suggests the conclusion that physicians and 
counselors should only have a qualified privilege to inform closely re-
lated relatives of their risk in specific instances. 
2. Qualified Privilege to Warn 
One commentator describes the physician as having "the duty to 
maintain confidentiality ... if disclosure could harm the patient, while 
at the same time, a duty to disclose ... if confidentiality could cause 
138. See Glass, supra note 35, at 2158. 
139. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
140. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
141. HARPER, supra note 13, at 112-15. 
142. In addition, the mutation could have arisen at any point in the family history, possibly 
even with Jane. The farther back in the family tree, the smaller the chance that the mutation 
existed in those generations of the family. 
143. The degree of one's relatedness is based on how many "branches" away one is on the 
family tree or, more precisely, what percentage of genetic material is shared. For example, sib-
lings, children, and parents share one half of their genes; they are first-degree relatives. Uncles 
and aunts share one fourth of their genes with their nieces and nephews and are second-degree 
relatives, as are grandparents and grandchildren. Cousins are third-degree relatives and share 
one eighth of their genes. HARPER, supra note 13, at 112-15. 
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harm to a third party."144 This approach, however, does not resolve 
what to do when harm is possible from the fulfillment of both duties. 
The cases described in subsections II.A. l and II.A.2 suggest that if the 
harm from failing to warn outweighs the harm from disclosure, most 
jurisdictions would find a duty or privilege to warn. Tarasoff bal-
anced the breach of confidentiality and possible improper diagnosis 
against the harm of threatened life, implying that the duty to warn 
only exists if the harm in failing to disclose endangers another's life. 
"The risk that unnecessary warnings may be given is a reasonable 
price to pay for the lives of possible victims that may be saved."145 
Most courts would find a privilege to disclose, if not a duty to warn, 
when life or health is at risk.146 A few even recognize a disclosure 
privilege to protect against lesser harms.147 Thus, analyzing whether 
there is a duty or privilege to disclose genetic test results requires a 
balancing of the interests at stake. 
a. Harm from Disclosure. In one way, the harm from disclosure is 
less troublesome in the genetics context than in Tarasoff. Genetic test-
ing, like the diagnosis of many contagious diseases, is relatively cer-
tain 148 or at least frequently provides objective results. In contrast, 
psychotherapy, as the Tarasoff court acknowledged, involves some un-
certainty149 in that the diagnoses are qualitative and subjective.150 
Consequently, the disclosure of the diagnosis of many genetic or con-
tagious diseases may be less likely to cause the harm of disclosing im-
proper diagnoses. 151 
Despite the decreased concern in that regard, the patient may re-
fuse to comply for fear that the disclosure of test results will harm 
him. Just as stigmatization is a major concern in the AIDS context, 152 
it may well be a source of apprehension for those who carry a genetic 
"abnormality."153 Mary may fear that her daughter would be ill-
treated if others learn that she is genetically "male" or that she may be 
144. McVickar, supra note 90, at 341. 
145. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976). 
146. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
147. See, e.g., Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1958) (well-being of the fiancee 
sufficient justification to allow disclosure); see also supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text. 
148. Of course, genetic testing is by no means 100% certain. See supra note 59 and accom-
panying text. 
149. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551P.2d334, 346 (Cal. 1976) ("[t]aking note of 
the uncertain character of therapeutic prediction"). 
150. See Davis v. Lhim, 335 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (noting the inexactness 
of psychiatry). 
151. When technology is not available to test for specific disease genes, however, genetic 
diagnosis can be largely qualitative. 
152. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. 
153. This view, however, ignores the fact that everyone carries a few nonworking genes, 
which in the proper context could cause disease. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
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devastated py the knowledge. 154 Even genetic diseases that do not in-
volve gender may carry a stigma.155 Jane might feel abnormal or 
"damaged" because of the chromosome translocation, even though 
she is perfectly healthy .156 
A further fear of individuals in these contexts is that disclosure 
might harm family relations, especially because being a carrier influ-
ences procreative decisions.157 The patient may feel that relatives 
blame her for imposing this risk on them. This concern is related to 
the common, though unfounded, sense of causal responsibility for 
bringing the disease into the family. 158 Other patients may refuse to 
divulge their test results, knowing that the relative would not choose 
prenatal testing and would only suffer trepidation in learning of the 
risk. Those who oppose abortion may fear the information would be 
used for pregnancy termination. 
An additional worry, frequently voiced in the AIDS debate, is that 
disclosure would inhibit people from pursuing testing. 159 Because 
AIDS is truly becoming an epidemic, 160 there is a unique public inter-
est in encouraging voluntary HIV-testing. While genetic disease is not 
an epidemic, most would agree that genetic testing should be available 
without the fear of harm from disclosure. 
These concerns simply add to the general presumption in favor of 
protecting confidentiality: "[i]t is often necessary for the patient to 
give information about himself which would be most embarrassing or 
154. Families often experience particular difficulty with a diagnosis of TFS. Many will avoid 
telling the affected children or other family members because they feel a great deal of shame in 
the diagnosis. See H.T. Lynch et al., Genetic Counseling and Cancer, in PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DIMENSIONS, supra note 50, at 221, 235-36. 
155. Andrews & Jaeger, supra note 7, at 77; Verle E. Headings, Psychological Issues in Sickle 
Cell Counseling, in PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 50, at 185, 186; Sylvia Schild, 
Psychological Issues in Genetic Counseling of Phenylketonuria, in PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS, 
supra note 50, at 135, 141. 
156. See Rose Grobstein, Amniocentesis Counseling, in PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS, supra 
note 50, at 107, 112; supra text accompanying note 80. 
157. Schild, supra note 155, at 142-43; Sorenson, supra note 21, at 175; see also infra note 
249. 
158. Such views only underscore the need to educate patients appropriately about genetics 
and the modes of transmission. See PATRICIA T. KELLEY, DEALING WITH DILEMMA 82, 115 
(1977). When genetic disease exists in a family there is often a desire to place blame or at least to 
understand what the family or someone else did to "cause" the outcome. Seymour Kessler, The 
Process of Communication, Decision Making and Coping in Genetic Counseling, in PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 50, at 35, 47. Therefore, some find it is easier to explain away a 
seemingly random inheritance by attributing it to something that someone did or did not do. 
KELLEY, supra, at 38, 79-80, 82, 114-15; Paula E. Hollerbach, Reproductive Attitudes and the 
Genetic Counse/ee, in COUNSELING IN GENETICS, supra note 83, at 155, 176; Lewis B. Holmes, 
Prospective Counseling for Hereditary Ma/formations in Newborns, in GENETIC COUNSELING 
241, 244; Seymour Kessler, The Genetic Counseling Session, in PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS, 
supra note 50, at 65, 83. 
159. Cf Talbot, supra note 90, at 359-60. 
160. See Prevention, supra note 134, at 38-80 (describing the nature of the epidemic in its 
second decade). 
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harmful to him if given general circulation."161 Moreover, revealing 
such information" 'betray[s] ... a professional secret to the detriment 
of a patient.' " 162 In addition, the patient has "sufficient justification 
for reasonable expectation ... that the physician has promised to keep 
confidential all information given by the patient.''163 
b. Harm from Failure To Disclose. Because the common law has 
offered convincing arguments to find a presumption in favor of confi-
dentiality, 164 a disclosure privilege should only be found if the harm in 
failing to disclose outweighs the harm from disclosure. There are clear 
differences, however, between the risks in failing to warn about a con-
tagious disease or a violent person and failing to warn about disease 
genes. Someone with a contagious disease or with violent propensities 
can harm others by exposing them to infection or by assaulting them, 
respectively. Yet individuals with disease genes do not put relatives at 
risk by carrying the gene. Their relatives have no risk of becoming 
carriers; they only have the risk of finding out that they are carriers. 
Informing relatives that there is a familial disease gene, however, 
can affect the fate of the unborn. A person with a disease gene places 
her unborn children at risk of carrying that gene; the offspring either 
will or will not carry the gene. With current technology, 165 the un-
born child who inherits the disease gene faces the possibility of being 
born with the gene or being spared the disease166 though abortion. 167 
In contrast, a person who avoids exposure to an infectious disease can 
remain disease free. Moreover, the risk in the genetics context deals 
with individuals who do not yet exist. Although courts have held that 
individuals can owe duties to the unborn, 168 it is impossible to hold 
161. Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920) (per curiam). 
162. 177 N.W. at 832 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 2721 (1913)). 
163. Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 832 (Ala. 1973) (plurality opinion). 
164. See supra subsections II.A.I.a and 11.A.1.b. 
165. When gene therapy becomes available for certain genetic diseases, the argument be-
comes quite different. In that case, the unborn child has the possibility of being born alive with-
out the disease if gene therapy is used. Gene therapy, however, is still fairly remote for most 
genetic diseases. See Miller, supra note 4, at 455; Verma, supra note 4, at 68. 
166. This assumes that the fetus carries either two recessive disease genes, a single dominant 
disease gene, or an unbalanced translocation, all of which can cause disease, not simply a single 
recessive disease or balanced translocation, which does not cause disease. 
167. This situation mirrors the dilemma courts face with wrongful life challenges, in which 
individuals sue for negligence in counseling or genetic testing that allows the child to be born 
with a birth defect or genetic disease. The claim is that, but for the physician's or counselor's 
negligence, the child would not have been born and therefore would have been spared suffering 
from the defect. See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980); 
Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987). Most courts deny compensation 
on the grounds that any life is better than no life at all. See, e.g., 512 N.E.2d at 696-97. 
168. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977) (holding physician liable 
for giving an Rh negative woman a blood transfusion with Rh positive blood so that years later 
the mother's Rh sensitization damaged her Rh positive child during pregnancy); Monusko v. 
Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (holding physician liable for birth defects in the 
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that there is a duty to warn one who does not yet, and may never, 
exist. 
Despite the informed relatives' inability to avoid carrying an inher-
ited gene, warnings would allow them to prevent certain harms. If 
informed of their risk, for example, some of Jane's siblings might have 
prenatal testing if they are found to have the translocation. They may 
plan to terminate pregnancies in which the fetus inherits an unbal-
anced form of the translocation, or they may simply want the op-
tion.169 Alternatively, they may want the information to be 
emotionally prepared and to inform the obstetrician that the fetus may 
be affected.17° Awareness of the relative's disease gene or chromo-
somal abnormality could prevent the harm in giving birth to a child 
with a genetic disease or in being unprepared for such an outcome. 
Failure to disclose, therefore, may lead to varying degrees of harm 
depending on the values and beliefs of the relative. By the Tarasoff 
standard, the imbalance of interests is not great enough to impose a 
duty to warn, although courts may find it sufficient to create a privi-
lege to disclose under Moench.171 
Failure to disclose in other situations may pose more significant 
threats. Mary's nieces, for instance, are not only at risk for being car-
riers, but also for having TFS. Serious harm could befall them if the 
syndrome remains undiagnosed and they develop malignant, inguinal 
tumors.172 Similarly, if the patient carries the gene for a form of can-
cer, like retinoblastoma, which early detection can prevent, informed 
relatives may be able to avoid developing cancer. 173 Preventive care 
may ameliorate some incurable genetic diseases. Those with Marfan 
syndrome can significantly reduce the risk of heart aneurysms and 
death by taking medications and avoiding heavy exercise. 174 In these 
and related situations, disclosure of genetic information may save 
lives, resulting in a balance of interests that warrants a duty to warn 
under Tarasoff, or at least a privilege to disclose. 
c. No Duty, but a Qualified Privilege, to Warn. The duty to warn 
does not only require that the balance of interests favors saving a life 
over preserving patient confidentiality. The Tarasoff court also argued 
that therapists have a duty to prevent foreseeable harm by controlling 
patient's child resulting from a rubella infection during pregnancy because the physician failed to 
immunize the patient against rubella before her pregnancy). 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. Of course, other siblings might prefer to 
leave their pregnancy outcome to fate and opt not to have any testing at all. In those cases, the 
information might create anxiety, but it would also prepare them for the possibility of disease. 
170. See supra text accompanying note SO. 
171. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
173. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
174. R.E. Pyeritz, Marfan Syndrome, in 2 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 
1047, 1060-61. 
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the actions of the dangerous patient or by warning the third party .175 
The court's reasoning implies that when the patient himself poses a 
risk to a third party, his confidentiality may be violated unless the 
patient can be controlled. A genetics patient, in contrast, does not 
pose a risk to her relatives; her actions, unlike those of contagious or 
violent people, do not present foreseeable harm. Rather it is the dis-
ease gene and ignorance regarding carrier status that pose a risk to the 
relative. Thus a strict application of Tarasoff does not result in the 
finding of a duty to warn, even when the relative faces a risk of death. 
Case law, however, supports a privilege to warn in certain cases.176 
Although the privilege to disclose derives from contagious disease 
cases in which the patients pose a threat ofinfection,177 courts base the 
privilege to disclose on the likelihood of harm in failing to disclose, 
fairly consistently justifying disclosure for the protection of public 
health or another's life. Even if life is not at risk, disclosure can pre-
vent a lesser degree of harm if relatives could use genetic information 
to make reproductive decisions or to decrease the risk of future illness. 
In these cases, there should be a privilege to disclose only if there is a 
clear imbalance of harm in favor of disclosure. Given the importance 
of patient confidentiality, the presumption should lie against disclosure 
unless it can prevent foreseeable and significant harm. 
Physicians and genetic counselors should therefore have the privi-
lege to disclose genetic information to at-risk relatives or their physi-
cians, in certain cases.178 Courts or legislatures, however, should 
never compel them to disclose. 179 When there is a significant risk that 
certain relatives carry the gene or chromosome rearrangement, avail-
able technology might allow the relatives to receive important medical 
benefits or make important reproductive decisions. Yet, only when 
harm from disclosure is significantly less should courts or legislatures 
grant the physician or counselor the privilege to warn the relatives and 
175. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976). 
176. See supra section 11.A.1.c. 
177. See supra notes 109-11, 118-121 and accompanying text. 
178. PRESlDENT'S CoMMN. FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING, AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC 
CONDmONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC 
SCREENING, COUNSELING, AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS (1983) makes similar recommenda-
tions in terms of ethical duties: 
A professional's ethical duty of confidentiality to an immediate patient or client can be 
overridden only if several conditions are satisfied: (1) reasonable efforts to elicit voluntary 
consent to disclosure have failed; (2) there is a high probability both that harm will occur if 
the information is withheld and that the disclosed information will actually be used to avert 
harm; (3) the harm that identifiable individuals would suffer would be serious; and (4) ap-
propriate precautions are taken to ensure that only the genetic information needed for diag-
nosis and/or treatment of the disease in question is disclosed. 
Id. at 44. 
179. But see Janet A. Korbin, Comment, Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30 UCLA 
L. REv. 1283, 1307-15 (1983), for the argument that there should be a duty to warn. 
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breach the patient's confidentiality. Moreover, physicians or genetic 
counselors who lack the necessary information to weigh the competing 
interests should not be accorded the privilege to disclose. They should 
never disclose patient information without first trying to discover the 
patient's concerns and to impress upon the patient her moral duty to 
inform relatives. Ideally, the patient should be the one to inform fam-
ily members.18° Finally, physicians and genetic counselors should try 
to warn without breaching patient confidentiality, that is, by informing 
the relative's physician of the relative's risk without identifying the 
patient.181 
C. The Carrier's Duty to Inform 
Establishing whether a person with a disease gene or chromosomal 
translocation has a legal duty to inform high risk relatives is less 
straightforward than determining whether physicians and counselors 
have such a duty. The patient arguably has a moral duty, even if no 
such legal duty exists. One commentator notes, "[o]n the ground of 
preserving the life and welfare of the family, it may be argued that 
every family member has the general obligation to inform other rele-
vant family members of matters relating to their welfare and more 
broadly to the value of preserving the family." 182 This commentator 
notes the conflict with privacy issues if such a moral obligation ex-
ists.183 He points out exceptions to these legal protections when the 
public health is at stake. Therefore, "an argument may plausibly be 
mounted on the basis that an individual's genetic make-up may im-
pinge on the welfare of other family members and is not therefore 
purely personal in character."184 To sustain such a view, he suggests, 
one must find that genetic diseases constitute a public health concern. 
The commentator fails to recognize that courts have made exceptions 
to the right to confidentiality not only for public health reasons, but 
also for the well-being of another. 185 Even accepting that the individ-
ual right to privacy could not be infringed upon except for public 
health reasons, one could make a strong claim that genetic diseases are 
a public health concern given the interests discussed in subsection 
180. See infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text. 
181. This presupposes that the relative's physician is different from the patient's. If this is 
not true, the relative may be able to discern who the patient is. In balancing the interests at 
stake, courts or legislatures should consider these circumstances among the possible harms to the 
plaintiff. 
182. Sumner B. Twiss, Ethical Issues in Genetic Screening: Models of Genetic Responsibility, 
in ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 21, at 225, 237. Twiss examines the 
moral obligations related to genetic testing in the context of five models: the parental, parent-
family, parent-citizen, parent-species, and parent-ethnic population models. He applies the sec-
ond in finding a duty to provide genetic information to relatives at high risk. Id. at 237-38. 
183. Id. at 249. 
184. Id. 
185. See supra notes 109-122 and accompanying text. 
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II.B.2.b, 186 the scarcity of medical resources, the· use of public funding 
for newborn screening, and the human suffering involved.187 
These arguments, therefore, support the notion that one has a 
moral responsibility to provide high-risk relatives with relevant genetic 
information. But the existence of a moral duty does not require that 
there be a corresponding legal duty. Since this issue has never come 
before the courts, one can find a helpful analogy in the AIDS context. 
Legislatures and courts have begun to struggle with whether HIV-pos-
itive people should be required to inform others of their status. Some 
legislatures have made it a felony to withhold knowingly such infor-
mation from partners and to engage in behavior that puts another at 
risk.188 Along similar lines, courts and legislatures have compelled 
disclosure of HIV test results to the alleged victims of individuals who 
have been convicted or accused of sexual crimes.189 
Recognizing how the issues in the AIDS context are distinct from 
those in the genetics context is useful in determining whether the pa-
tient should have a legal duty to inform relatives of her test results. In 
the former scenario, the HIV-positive individual is capable of actually 
causing harm to the party who desires disclosure. In the latter, the 
patient does not cause the relative's genetic risks; she simply does not 
help the relative learn of his risk. This distinction between potential 
misfeasance and nonfeasance play out differently in tort law, thus re-
sulting in differences regarding the duty to inform. 
If someone infected with HIV fails to disclose, whether before or 
after exposing his partner, the partner may not be able to protect ade-
quately against infection or receive early, more beneficial medical 
treatment. Thus the infected individual subjects the other to the risk 
186. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text. 
187. See Damme, supra note 21, at 820-23; Twiss, supra note 182, at 249-250. 
188. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS.§ 333.5114a (1991); State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1992) (affirming the conviction of a man found guilty of "intentionally exposing his 
sexual partners to ... HIV"). 
189. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 333.5129 (1991) (requiring HIV testing of defendants 
convicted of sexual crimes, unless court determines it is inappropriate, and requiring disclosure 
to defendants' victims); see also Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898 (D.V.I. 1991) (hold-
ing that the Fourth Amendment permits HIV testing of defendant for benefit of rape victim), 
ajfd. mem., 961 F.2d 1567 (3d Cir. 1992); People v. Anonymous, 582 N.Y.S.2d 350 (County Ct. 
1992) (holding that defendant who stated that she was HIV-positive after biting a police officer 
could be compelled to have HIV test if results were disclosed only to attorneys); State v. Stark, 
832 P.2d 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that there was no error in refusing to suppress 
information of HIV test results of defendant convicted of intentional HIV exposure); cf. Harris v. 
Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that although isolation of HIV-positive in-
mates would identify their HIV status, this was not a violation of privacy rights); Doe v. Roe, 
444 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that probative value of HIV test result was 
greater than the stigma from disclosure). But see St. Hilaire v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 
No. 90-15344, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11620 (9th Cir. May 30, 1991) (unpublished opinion) 
(mem.), (affirming decision to deny motion to segregate and identify HIV-positive inmates) cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 255 (1991); Doe v. Hirsch, 731 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying request 
for HIV status of deceased intravenous drug abuser with whose blood police officers came into 
contact). 
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of contracting a serious and life-threatening disease or of failing to 
forestall the harm from infection. 
In the AIDS case, the duty to warn would derive from the excep-
tion to the tort rule that one need not actively aid another.190 Here, 
there is an affirmative duty to act because one has endangered an-
other.191 That is, when one has created an unreasonable risk of harm 
to another, the actor has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avert the 
harm that is likely to follow. 192 Before the sexual act, there is argua-
bly a special relationship, because providing the opportunity to have 
sex might be viewed as creating a danger against which there is a duty 
to protect. Someone infected with HIV puts his partners at an unrea-
sonable risk of harm if he engages in behavior that can transmit the 
virus. Warning them of the infection so that they can take preventive 
measures would fulfil his duty of reasonable care.193 
In the genetic disease context, the carrier does not put others at 
risk for becoming carriers. The risk of harm is simply a function of 
nature. Therefore the carrier does not have an affirmative duty to 
warn her relatives because she has not put them at risk. One is not 
liable for nonfeasance if one is not responsible for the peril. 194 Thus 
she would have a duty to take "reasonable action to protect [the other] 
against unreasonable risk of physical harm" only if there is a special 
relationship.195 The nonexclusive list of relationships that warrant 
this exception includes those in which one has custody over an-
other, 196 which presumably encompasses the parent and minor-child 
relationship. The law is gradually adding to the list relationships in 
which there is mutual dependence, which could include husband and 
wife. 197 The nature of the relationships between parent and minor-
child and between husband and wife involves a level of dependence 
that does not exist between a person and her siblings, aunts, uncles, 
and so forth. Parents clearly have a custodial role that places their 
child in a position of dependence vis-a-vis the parents. 198 The criminal 
law recognizes the mutual dependence of the spousal relationship by 
190. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
191. Id. § 321. 
192. Id. This is true whether or not the act is tortious or innocent. Id. 
193. There are, however, very good policy reasons against imposing such a duty, which are 
beyond the scope of this Note. The discussion is merely meant to contrast the contagious disease 
situation from the genetic situation, not to argue that there should be tort liability for exposing 
someone to the AIDS virus. In fact, this Note's author believes that while there is a moral duty 
to inform sexual and needle·sharing partners, there should not be tort liability for failure to do 
so. 
194. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 190, § 314. 
195. Id. § 314A . 
. 196. Id. 
197. Id. cmt. b. The tort law has not yet recognized the duty of protective action between 
spouses. Id. 
198. See 59 AM. JuR. 2o Parent and Child §§ 10, 23 (1987 & Supp. 1993). 
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imposing special duties to take positive action to aid one another.199 
Tort law, however, has not yet imposed such a duty within the marital 
relationship.200 It therefore seems very unlikely that tort law would 
find such a duty between siblings and more distant relatives. Conse-
quently, when there is no basis for an affirmative duty to protect rela-
tives, carriers cannot be held to a duty to warn relatives of their risk of 
carrying a disease gene. 
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY TEsTING 
The issues regarding the disclosure of test results to relatives relate 
directly to the issues of mandatory testing for the benefit of a relative. 
The latter necessarily involves disclosure if the purpose of compulsory 
testing is to provide beneficial information to the relative. There are, 
however, additional concerns and competing interests that must be 
considered along with the disclosure issues when addressing the con-
stitutionality of compulsory testing. In fact, the interests of the poten-
tial proband become significantly greater in this context: not only may 
the proband have disclosure concerns, but she now faces potential 
harm from being forced to discover whether she carries a disease gene 
after she has consciously decided not to learn this information. This 
Part will argue that her combined interest in not knowing and in 
avoiding bodily intrusion is fundamental. 
Current technology has made this conflict possible because scien-
tists can now discover the genetic bases of some diseases before identi-
fying the protein defect.201 For example, scientists discovered the 
genes for cystic fibrosis,202 neurofibromatosis,203 and Marfan syn-
199. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 190, § 314A cmts. a-c. 
200. Id. 
201. This is possible by studying many large families in which a particular genetic disease has 
been prevalent. By testing several different markers from the various chromosomes, scientists 
look for statistical evidence that one of the markers, each of which corresponds to a particular 
region on a chromosome, is associated with the disease. The research then focuses on a narrow 
area of the relevant chromosome until the actual DNA region that codes for the deficient, dis-
ease-causing protein is found. See Friedmann, supra note 6, at 408-09. 
202. See Bat-Sheva Kerem et al., Identification of the Cystic Fibrosis Gene: Genetic Analysis, 
245 SCIENCE 1073 (1989); John R. Riordan et al., Identification of the Cystic Fibrosis Gene: 
Cloning and Characterization of Complementary DNA, 245 SCIENCE 1066 (1989). Cystic fibrosis 
is an autosomal recessive disorder in which affected individuals develop excessive mucus ac-
cumulation that causes lung disease, pancreatic insufficiency, and growth impairment. Eitan 
Kerem et al., The Relation Between Genotype and Phenotype in Cystic Fibrosis Analysis of the 
Most Common Mutation, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517, 1517 (1990); Lap-Chee Tsui & Manuel 
Buchwald, Biochemical and Molecular Genetics of Cystic Fibrosis, 20 ADVANCES IN HUM. GE-
NETICS 153-54 and tbl. 1 (1991). 
203. See Richard M. Cawthon et al., A Major Segment of the Neurofibromatosis Type I Gene: 
cDNA Sequence, Genomic Structure, and Point Mutations, 62 CELL 193 (1990); David Viskochil 
et al., Deletions and a Translocation Interrupt a Cloned Gene at the Neurofibromatosis Type I 
Locus, 62 CELL 187 (1990); Margaret R. Wallace et al., Type I Neurofibromatosis Gene: Identifi-
cation of a Lorge Transcript Disrupted in Three NFI Patients, 249 SCIENCE 181 (1990). See supra 
note 55 for a description of neurofibromatosis. 
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drome204 without knowledge of the disease mechanisms. As a result, 
for many genetic diseases, testing is currently only possible through 
linkage analysis.205 As a greater number of genetic diseases are detect-
able through linkage analysis, more situations like Bob's may arise, in 
which a family member who is needed for testing simply refuses to 
participate. Even when direct testing is sometimes possible, linkage 
analysis may be required, as in Sarah's case.206 
This Part examines the constitutionality of compelling a person to 
have genetic testing for the benefit of a relative and concludes that the 
state may not use its police power to do so. Section III.A reasons that 
the police power gives states the authority to legislate with regard to 
genetic testing. Section 111.B argues, however, that substantive due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that access to deci-
sions to have genetic testing should be treated as a fundamental pri-
vacy right. Therefore, section III.C concludes, courts must apply the 
two-part scrutiny analysis to any potential infringement of this right. 
Section 111.D contends that, under strict scrutiny, the first part of the 
analysis is not fulfilled: there is no compelling state interest when the 
intrusiveness of forced testing is weighed against the remoteness of the 
benefit. Therefore compulsory testing in these scenarios is unconstitu-
tional. The section then demonstrates that, even if a court found the 
state interest compelling, legislation cannot be narrowly tailored when 
incurable diseases are at issue, though testing for curable diseases 
could potentially be so drawn. Nevertheless, this section contends 
normative and public policy reasons mandate that genetic testing for 
the benefit of a relative remain voluntary, even for curable genetic 
diseases. 
A. The State's Police Power 
The Court has long recognized the power of the states to promote 
the health, welfare, and safety of the public as a constitutional power 
derived from the Tenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.207 
The Supreme Court distinguished between areas that the states and 
204. See Harry C. Dietz et al., Mar:fan Syndrome Caused by a Recurrent de Novo Missense 
Mutation in the Fibril/in Gene, 352 NATURE 337 (1991). Marfan syndrome is an autosomal 
dominant - that is, it is not carried on the sex chromosomes - connective tissue disorder that 
usually manifests with disproportionately long extremities, tall stature, lankiness, and joint lax-
ity. Individuals are at risk for aortic aneurysms and dislocation of the lenses and joints. See 
Pyeritz, supra note 174, at 1047. 
205. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
206. Depending on the details of the discovery of the Huntington's gene, linkage or family 
studies may still be required for many Huntington's families. See supra notes 68 & 70. 
207. See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 67-68 (1922) (states have jurisdiction of "subjects of 
public interest ... which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment"); Hamilton v. Ken-
tucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919) ("That the United States lacks the 
police power, and that this was reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, is true."); Leisy 
v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 127 (1890) (Gray, J., joined by Harlan & Brewer, JJ., dissenting) 
("Among the powers ... reserved to the several States [by the Tenth Amendment] is what is 
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Congress control. 208 While it held that states do not have the right to 
regulate interstate commerce, it acknowledged that they have an "im-
mense mass oflegislation, which embraces every thing within the terri-
tory of a state, not surrendered to the general government . . . 
[including i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, [and] health laws of 
every description. "209 
One justification for the use of the police power is to protect the 
general health of the citizens. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 210 the 
Supreme Court held that a local health regulation requiring adults to 
undergo smallpox vaccinations was a legitimate exercise of the police 
power. While recognizing that vaccinations infringe upon liberty to 
some degree, the Court noted that "liberty . . . does not import an 
absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circum-
stances, wholly freed from restraint."211 The community's "right to 
protect itself against an epidemic ... which threatens the safety of its 
members" legitimized the minor infringement.212 The Court further 
noted that quarantines to prevent the spread of contagious diseases 
like cholera or yellow fever might be constitutional even though they 
would restrict liberty to some extent.213 Notable was the Court's view 
that "public health is a primary obligation of the state."214 
More recently, state legislatures have imposed mandatory testing 
schemes for venereal diseases, generally in the context of awarding 
marital licenses.215 Courts have upheld statutes requiring premarital 
testing for syphilis under the theory that such legislation is within the 
realm of the police power.216 Although the Supreme Court recognized 
commonly called the police power."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTlONAL LAW 
§ 5-20, at 379 (2d ed. 1988). 
208. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
209. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203. In Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1878), the Court 
supported the notion of a limited, but clearly defined police power: "While we unhesitatingly 
admit that a State may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or 
property within its borders ... it may not interfere with transportation into or through the State, 
beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection." 95 U.S. at 472. 
210. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
211. 197 U.S. at 26. 
212. 197 U.S. at 27. 
213. 197 U.S. at 29. 
214. Damme, supra note 21, at 809. Earlier, in Husen, the Court also recognized a state's 
right to pass legislation to protect the welfare of the people by restricting animals and people 
with infectious disease from entering its borders, as long as the laws were not more restrictive 
than necessary and did not invade the domain of the federal government. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 
95 U.S. 465, 471-73 (1878). 
215. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 22-1 lA-15 (1990); CAL. CIV. CoDE § 4300 (Supp. 1993); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 46b-26 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-40 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-20 
(West 1968); PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 1305 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-2-3 (1988). 
216. See, e.g., Fisher v. Sweet, 35 A.2d 756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944) (holding that a syphilis 
testing requirement is within the state's power); In re Kilpatrick, 375 S.E.2d 794 (W. Va. 1988) 
(upholding the constitutionality of statutes requiring premarital serological testing for marriage 
license); see also Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 127 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Ohio 1955) ("Regulations 
1890 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1854 
that marriage is a fundamental right in Zablocki v. Redhai/, 211 Justice 
Stewart argued in his concurrence that venereal disease testing re-
quirements are legitimate prerequisites to obtaining a marriage 
license. 218 
Given the constitutionality of using the police power to regulate 
matters related to public health and the general well-being of the com-
munity, states arguably have the authority to legislate certain genetic 
testing statutes. Although genetic diseases cannot be spread through 
contact and therefore do not affect the public in the way contagious 
diseases do, they legitimately concern the state because they affect the 
well-being of some of its citizens. Newborn screening legislation to 
detect and treat specific genetic diseases has never been challenged,219 
bolstering the presumption that this activity is an appropriate exercise 
of the state's police power. 
Merely defending genetic testing legislation as a valid use of the 
police power, however, does not suffice. The issue is not simply 
whether the state has power to protect "life, liberty, health, or prop-
erty,"220 but whether such legislation withstands constitutional scru-
tiny. As argued below, any legislation regarding mandatory genetic 
testing involves fundamental privacy rights and therefore must survive 
strict scrutiny analysis. 
B. Genetic Testing and Fundamental Privacy Rights 
Although states clearly have the power to enact legislation to pro-
tect the welfare of their people, any such legislation is subject to some 
level of constitutional scrutiny.221 Public health measures related to 
infectious disease generally receive only a minimal level of scrutiny,222 
which requires that there be a reasonable relation between a legitimate 
state interest and the statute. If a public health measure appears "ca-
pricious, arbitrary, or otherwise unreasonable and oppressive," the 
statute cannot stand. 223 The standard is necessarily lenient. 
The Supreme Court has applied minimal scrutiny even to highly 
invasive public health measures. In one of the most controversial ex-
relating to control of venereal disease [and] blood tests for marriage licenses • • • have all been 
held valid as based on police power exercised in regard to public health."). 
217. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
218. 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
219. See Damme, supra note 21, at 820-23. 
220. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878). 
221. TRIBE, supra note 207, § 15-1, at 1306. 
222. Damme, supra note 21, at 805. 
223. Id. In support of this view the Jacobson Court stated, if a public health statute "has no 
real or substantial relation to [its] objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of 
rights secured by the fundamental law,'' the courts must determine this to "give effect to the 
Constitution." Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905). 
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amples, Buck v. Bell, 224 the Supreme Court upheld a court order for 
the involuntary sterilization of a "feebleminded" woman who was 
both the daughter of a "feebleminded" woman and the mother of an 
"illegitimate feebleminded" child on the grounds that "the welfare of 
society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental 
defectives .... "225 In his very short opinion, Justice Holmes com-
pared the social benefits of sterilization to those of vaccination: "[t]he 
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to 
cover cutting the Fallopian tubes."226 Suggesting that societal harm 
had already been too great, Holmes coldly declared, "[t]hree genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough. "221 
While some state courts have also supported involuntary steriliza-
tion of the mentally impaired,228 Skinner v. Ok/ahoma 229 suggests 
that such invasiveness might not always be constitutionally acceptable. 
In Skinner, the Court held unconstitutional a statute requiring the 
sterilization of habitual criminals who had been convicted three times 
of felonies " 'involving moral turpitude.' "230 In condemning the stat-
ute, the Court proclaimed that procreation is "one of the basic civil 
rights of man" and "fundamental to the very existence and survival of 
the race."231 Although Skinner did not overrule Buck v. Bell, it re-
flects the beginning of the Court's expanding interpretation of the pro-
tection of fundamental rights. 
Many public health measures require some form of intrusion upon 
personal liberty, whether they involve mandatory vaccination, quaran-
tine, blood testing, or sterilization. Although the Court often allows 
such invasions, it has not consistently applied the same level of judicial 
scrutiny.232 This inconsistency may simply reflect evolving attitudes 
over time. It also may stem from the various levels of personhood the 
measures violate. Some levels of personal identity and privacy may be 
accorded greater protection against governmental intrusions because 
they are deemed fundamental. Others may be more susceptible to en-
224. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
225. 274 U.S. at 205. 
226. 274 U.S. at 207. 
227. 274 U.S. at 207. 
228. See, e.g., In re Sterilization of Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307 (N.C. 1976); Cook v. State, 495 
P.2d 768 (Or. Ct. App. 1972). But see Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 365-68 (D. Conn. 
1978) (holding that the right to privacy means that not even the severely mentally retarded can 
be sterilized absent "valid consent"). 
229. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
230. 316 U.S. at 536 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 173 (1935)). 
231. 316 U.S. at 541. The Court's basis for invalidating the statute was its violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against habitual criminals. 
232. Compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (applying minimal scrutiny to reproductive 
rights) with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to reproductive rights); 
see also infra notes 256-61 and accompanying text. 
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croachment.233 Not all forms of bodily intrusion are necessarily "vio-
lations of the self or usurpations of personality."234 Professor Tribe 
emphasizes the need to determine when "governmental intrusion 
reaches a level of significance sufficient to invoke strict scrutiny as an 
invasion of personhood. "235 This argument suggests that the level of 
scrutiny should depend on how vital to one's personhood, or individ-
ual identity, the liberty or threatened privacy right is. 
Courts have accorded certain liberty and privacy rights significant 
protection under the "substantive" component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.236 There is no language that 
describes precisely which interests qualify as fundamental rights.237 
Nevertheless, actions and decisions that are central to personal iden-
tity and personhood, such as those involving the rearing of children, 
procreation, vocation, and marriage, have been held fundamental 
under substantive due process.238 The Court recently declared in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 239 
[M]atters ... involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of exist-
ence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Be-
liefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State.240 
Closely related to personhood is the notion of identity, which can 
mean different things. Identity may simply mean that which defines 
each individual, that is, "being the same with something described."241 
In that sense, identity remains fixed. Identity, however, may implicate 
one's sense of self and one's role in the world. Understood in that 
way, identity becomes closely linked to personhood. The Court ex-
233. Compare Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding New York statute that re· 
quires that copies of prescriptions for certain drugs be submitted to the state) with Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding the fundamental right of marital privacy in making 
contraceptive decisions). 
234. TRIBE, supra note 207, § 15-9, at 1330. 
235. Id. 
236. See id. § 15-3, at 1308-09. "'[I]t is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all 
fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution 
from invasion by the States.'" Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (quot· 
ing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)), 
237. " '[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found 
in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitu-
tion.'" 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
238. See TRIBE, supra note 207, § 15-1, at 1303-04. 
239. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
240. 112 S. Ct. at 2807. 
241. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1123 (1986). 
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pressed this second meaning of identity, in Whalen v. Roe, 242 when it 
described identity as "the interest in independence in making certain 
kinds of important decisions."243 
Some types of genetic data may influence personhood and the lat-
ter, more complex definition of personal identity.244 While con-
tracting chicken pox has virtually no effect on identity, the knowledge 
that one carries a disease gene may influence one's self-perception and 
definition of "one's own concept of existence" in a way most infectious 
diseases do not.245 Consequently, compelling an adult to have genetic 
testing does not merely involve the bodily intrusion of collecting a 
blood sample; it can also determine whether one is forced to learn 
something about herself she may have good reason to avoid, thus vio-
lating "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of impor-
tant decisions."246 
Among those important decisions is the right not to know whether 
one carries a disease gene. 247 People may resist testing to avoid the 
potential for genetic discrimination by insurers and employers,248 per-
sonal crisis, 249 or difficult personal decisions. 250 Many families find it 
burdensome to face the reproductive options and tests available to 
them today.251 Some believe testing only leads to worry: one may 
have a late onset gene for which there is no cure, or one may be at risk 
of passing a disease gene to one's child. In the latter case, the only 
choices may be failure to reproduce, accepting the risk of having an 
affected child, artificial insemination from a donor or ovum donation, 
242. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
243. 429 U.S. at 599-600. 
244. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
245. Of course, some infectious disease, such as AIDS, syphilis, and gonorrhea, may be im-
portant to one's identity given that these diseases are generally contracted through sexual contact 
or intravenous drug use, and therefore, for some people may be a reflection of behavior and 
identity. These diseases may be as intimately connected with one's identity as genetic diseases, 
but for different reasons. 
246. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). 
247. This is not to claim that the right is absolute. See infra text accompanying note 277. 
248. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39. Finding that one is a carrier, even if one will 
not develop a disease, can affect self-image or self-esteem. KELLEY, supra note 158, at 111-12; 
Grobstein, supra note 156, at 112; Schild, supra note 155, at 141. Identification of genetic disor-
ders or carrier status can be a contributing factor in marital discord, divorce, or other family 
problems. Hollerbach, supra note 158, at 179-80; Audrey T. McCollum & Ruth L. Silverberg, 
Psychosocial Advocacy, in COUNSELING IN GENETICS, supra note 83, at 239, 241-42. 
250. See John Pearn, Decision-Making and Reproductive Choice, in COUNSELING IN GENET-
ICS, supra note 83 at 223, 223. One scholar notes the different personal meaning genetic testing 
can have for different people depending on their beliefs, social relationships, and place in life. 
Sorenson, supra note 21, at 174-178. 
251. Many families expressed to this Note's author the anxiety they experienced in having 
reproductive options available to them, such as prenatal testing. Some felt overwhelmed by the 
choice; others felt an obligation to avail themselves of prenatal testing despite uncertainty about 
what they would do with the information. 
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or prenatal testing with an option to terminate.252 For families who 
oppose manipulating the genetic outcome of their offspring, genetic 
testing may imply a desire to alter the outcome, which would violate 
their strongly held principles.253 
The genetic counseling community strongly believes that individu-
als should make their own determinations about whether to have ge-
netic testing.254 Nondirective counseling, the guiding principle in 
genetic counseling, is based on informed consent: once people learn 
their risks and options, they can make educated decisions based on 
personal values and beliefs.255 Genetic testing is often intimately con-
nected with personal reproductive decisions, and thus no one should 
decide which choice is best for another. Even deciding to learn 
whether one carries a deleterious gene, irrespective of possible repro-
ductive decisions, is deeply personal. Given the very personal nature 
of genetic data, the right to decide whether to learn if one carries a 
disease gene should be accorded the status of a fundamental privacy 
right. 
C. Mandatory Genetic Testing Infringes Fundamental Rights 
When the "aspect of personhood" at stake is sufficient - or when 
the right involved is fundamental - the Due Process Clause requires 
that invasions of privacy receive more than minimal scrutiny.256 
Courts have used intermediate scrutiny in criminal cases in which the 
violation of privacy involved bodily intrusions, such as blood testing 
for alcohol levels and the removal of contraband from a suspect's body 
cavities.257 The Supreme Court has deemed other aspects of personal 
252. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. 
253. There are reasons, however, to have testing even if one would do nothing to alter the 
outcome. Testing allows one to be emotionally prepared for a child with a genetic disease, and it 
gives the obstetrician the opportunity to make special delivery provisions or to be prepared for 
complications. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
254. See Grobstein, supra note 156, at 108-10; Kessler, supra note 158, at 85-89; Ruth L. 
Silverberg & Lynn Godmilow, The Process of Genetic Counseling, in COUNSELING IN GENETICS, 
supra note 83, at 281, 287-88. 
255. See HARPER, supra note 13, at 13; Kessler, The Genetic Counseling Session, supra note 
158, at 85-87; Silverberg & Godmilow, supra note 254, at 283-84, 286-88. For a new perspective 
on the meaning of nondirective counseling, see Mark Yarborough et al., The Role of Beneficence 
in Clinical Genetics: Non-Directive Counseling Reconsidered, 10 THEORETICAL MED. 139 (1989). 
For the view that nondirective counseling is unattainable, see Angus Clarke, Is Non-Directive 
Genetic Counselling Possible?, 338 LANCET 998 (1991). 
256. TRIBE, supra note 207, § 15-9, at 1331-32. 
257. The Supreme Court did not find the use of medical testing to determine blood alcohol 
levels in a man arrested for intoxicated driving unreasonable. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757 (1966). In this case, the Court rejected Schmerber's substantive due process claim. In addi-
tion, the Court argued that although "[c]ompelled submission fails on one view to respect the 
'inviolability of human personality,' " 384 U.S. at 762 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 460 (1966)), the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination prohibition was not violated because 
"[n]ot even a shadow of testimonial compulsion .•. was involved." 384 U.S. at 765. An earlier 
decision, however, found impermissible policemen's attempts to remove capsules from the mouth 
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autonomy that are more deeply related to one's personhood - such as 
certain privacy rights - sufficiently fundamental to apply the strict 
scrutiny test. 258 Examples of such constitutionally protected private 
decisions include marriage,259 procreation,260 and childrearing.261 A 
strict scrutiny standard requires that the state's justification be com-
pelling and that its infringement be narrowly tailored to that 
interest. 262 
The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to analyze legisla-
tion that encroaches on certain fundamental rights, although it has not 
always explicitly defined its approach as such. For example, it struck 
down a Connecticut birth control statute in Griswold v. Connecticut 263 
because it impinged upon the marital relationship, which is within the 
"zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guar-
antees," including substantive due process.264 The Court's vehemence 
in defining the right as fundamental hinted at a strict scrutiny 
approach. 265 
Perhaps the clearest example of the Court's strict scrutiny ap-
proach is in Roe v. Wade. 266 In Roe, the Court held that under the 
Due Process Clause the privacy right to make reproductive decisions 
could only be infringed upon when the state's legitimate "interests in 
safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protect-
ing potential life ... [are] sufficiently compelling."267 Citing Griswold, 
the Court declared: "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, 
the Court has held that regulations limiting these rights may be justi-
fied only by a 'compelling state interest,' ... and that legislative enact-
ments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state 
of a suspected narcotics dealer as well as orders that a physician induce vomiting to retrieve the 
capsules. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). The Court's criticism of the bodily intrusion was not based on the violation of a different 
aspect of personhood than that described above. The level of intrusion was simply more egre-
gious - "conduct that shocks the conscience." 342 U.S. at 172. 
258. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Damme, supra note 21, at 820; Green & 
Capron, supra note 91, at 70-71; see infra notes 263-74 and accompanying text. 
259. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
260. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
261. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). 
262. See infra note 268 and accompanying text. 
263. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
264. The Court also derived Constitutional support for the right to privacy from the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 381 U.S. at 483·84; see TRIBE, supra note 207, § 15-3, at 
1308-09. 
265. See 381 U.S. at 485. A few years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the 
Court protected this fundamental right by condemning a Massachusetts law that prohibited the 
distribution of contraceptives to single people because it violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
266. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
267. 410 U.S. at 154. 
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interests at stake."268 
In the recent Planned Parenthood v. Casey 269 decision, the Court 
upheld the central premise of Roe. 270 It did, however, eliminate strict 
scrutiny analysis of "any regulation touching upon the abortion deci-
sion, "271 which post-Roe decisions had used. Instead, the Court al-
lows regulations that do not actually prohibit abortion, if they do not 
impose an "undue burden" on the individual.272 Consequently, the 
state may encourage women to consider arguments against abortion as 
long as the right to an abortion is not unduly burdened.273 
Nevertheless, this decision does not eliminate the strict scrutiny 
standard as applied to the infringement of fundamental privacy rights. 
As the Court noted, "not every law which makes a right more difficult 
to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right."274 Thus the 
Court essentially held that when the right is not wholly abridged, but 
simply made a bit more difficult to exercise, the undue burden stan-
dard applies. Implicit in the holding is that when legislation actually 
denies a fundamental right - as in the proscription of abortion -
only a compelling and narrowly tailored state interest, such as protect-
ing the potentiality of viable life, can survive constitutional scrutiny. 
The level of personal privacy at stake in mandatory genetic testing 
is fundamental in the same way as the right to make procreative deci-
sions. The decision to receive genetic testing bears on aspects of per-
sonhood and bodily integrity in many of the ways procreative 
decisions do. Both irrevocably affect one's control over one's destiny, 
both strongly influence one's identity,275 and both are deeply personal 
268. 410 U.S. at 155. Applying Roe's explicit delineation of strict scrutiny, the Court, in 
Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), affirmed inter alia the unconstitutionality 
of a statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors under sixteen. While the Court did 
not agree on the reasons the provision was unconstitutional, it did agree that the "same test must 
be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's right to decide to prevent conception 
or terminate pregnancy." The statute must fulfil a " 'compelling state interest' " and be " 'nar· 
rowly drawn'" in protecting legitimate state interests. 431 U.S. at 688 (quoting 410 U.S. at 155). 
269. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
270. The Casey Court, however, rejected the Roe Court's trimester framework, which held 
that during the first trimester, the state cannot interfere with the judgment of the woman's physi-
cian; in the second trimester, the state can regulate abortion to promote the health of the mother; 
and in the third trimester, it can regulate or prohibit abortion to protect the potentiality of 
human life. 410 U.S. at 164-65. The Casey Court ruled that the relevant time frame is pre- and 
post-viability. Thus before viability, the state cannot prohibit abortion, although it can promul-
gate regulations that do not impose an "undue burden on the right" to have an abortion. 112 S. 
Ct. at 2821 (plurality opinion). After viability, the state may " 'regulate, and even proscribe, 
abortion except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.'" 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (quoting 410 U.S. at 164-65). 
271. 112 S. Ct. at 2817. 
272. 112 S. Ct. at 2820. 
273. 112 S. Ct. at 2818. 
274. 112 S. Ct. at 2818. 
275. "[P]eople have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their 
views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the 
event that contraception should fail.'' 112 S. Ct. at 2809. 
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decisions.276 Certainly the results influence the very reproductive de-
cisions that the Court has treated as fundamental privacy rights. Con-
sequently, statutes infringing upon decisions whether to have genetic 
testing deserve strict scrutiny analysis under the Due Process Clause. 
D. Mandatory Genetic Testing Under the Strict Scrutiny Standard 
As is true with the fundamental right to make reproductive deci-
sions, the right to make decisions regarding genetic testing is not abso-
lute. 277 Therefore under strict scrutiny analysis courts apply a two-
part test: Is there a compelling state interest and is the legislation nar-
rowly tailored to that interest?278 Subsection III.D. l argues that the 
state interest in mandating genetic testing of one person for the benefit 
of another is not compelling and therefore it is unconstitutional. Sub-
section III.D.2 reasons that, even if there is a compelling state interest, 
mandatory testing for incurable genetic diseases cannot be sufficiently 
tailored to the state interest and therefore would still be unconstitu-
tional. While legislation compelling genetic testing for curable dis-
eases might arguably be narrowly tailored, this section argues 
normatively that the state should not compel such testing, even if a 
court found that the state interest is compelling. 
1. The State Interest 
Various justifications have been suggested for mandatory genetic 
testing: to gather information regarding the incidence and severity of 
genetic disease, to protect the public from genetic disease, to conserve 
health resources, and to protect future generations from genetic dis-
ease. 279 In addition, many of the state's interests apply to the harms 
that may arise from nondisclosure, as discussed in subsection II.B.2.b. 
Among those interests is a common justification for compulsory ge-
netic testing: some identified carriers will prevent the birth of children 
with detectable genetic diseases, which would benefit future genera-
tions. Although each genetic disease is relatively rare, compulsory 
testing could result in an overall decrease in the incidence of genetic 
disease, thus protecting future generations to some extent.280 Argua-
276. Of course, there are also differences between reproductive and genetic testing decisions. 
The former involves the loss of control over one's body. Another distinction is the existence of 
third parties with something at stake in the genetics context. In abortion cases, however, the 
father has some interest in the outcome of the decision whether to abort, which may conflict with 
the mother's desire. 
277. See 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
278. See 410 U.S. at 155. 
279. Green & Capron, supra note 91, at 69, 74. 
280. This argument is less concerned with actually protecting an affected fetus than eliminat-
ing disease genes from the gene pool so that fewer fetuses would be conceived with genetic dis-
eases. For a discussion regarding the protection of affected fetuses, see infra notes 292-96 and 
accompanying text. 
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bly, even if the decrease in the incidence of genetic disease is small, the 
state would have an interest in achieving this result. It is highly un-
likely, however, that the Court would find a state's interest in future 
generations compelling. In fact, Roe and Casey explicitly declare that 
the state's compelling interest in protecting the potentiality of life be-
gins only at the point of viability.281 If the state's interest in protecting 
the unviable fetus is not compelling, surely the state must have even 
less interest in protecting the unconceived. 
Another potentially compelling state interest is to protect existing 
life. One might defend legislation that mandates genetic testing as a 
public health measure to protect the life of the state's citizens. The 
Supreme Court has explicitly held that the state interest in protecting 
the potentiality of life is sufficiently compelling to infringe upon a fun-
damental right of privacy when legislation is narrowly drawn to this 
interest.2 82 Certainly, one might argue, the state's interest in protect-
ing the lives of existing persons is equally compelling; thus mandatory 
testing of genetic diseases that threaten one's life and well-being might 
be justified as a compelling legislative interest. 
Yet a closer examination of the distinctions between decisions to 
abort and refusals to be tested for the benefit of another suggests that 
the interest in protecting life is not compelling with regard to the lat-
ter. Prohibiting abortion to protect a viable fetus is different from the 
requirement that one undergo genetic testing to provide information 
that may be crucial to protect another life.283 In the former instance, 
the state forbids an action that causes harm; in other words, it pre-
vents misfeasance. In the latter case, the state compels one to help 
another through an affirmative action; that is, it prohibits nonfeasance. 
These distinctions are significant in the tort context in which one has a 
duty to avoid activities that cause harm, but in which one does not 
have an affirmative duty to protect others from harm one has not 
caused.284 
This tort analysis is useful in balancing the harms and benefits to 
determine whether the state interest is in fact compelling. First, it 
helps establish which mandate is more intrusive. Proscription of mis-
feasance is less intrusive than proscription of nonfeasance. When the 
state's interest in protecting life requires that one avoid causing harm, 
the infringement is slighter than when it requires that one actively cor-
rect a harm one has not caused. In addition, the misfeasance-nonfea-
sance distinction reflects the immediacy of the harm the state is trying 
to avert. In the former instance, preventing the misfeasant act in-
281. 112 S. Ct at 2821 (plurality opinion); 410 U.S. at 164·65. 
282. 410 U.S. at 155. 
283. For example, if the genetic disease were curable, knowledge that one has the gene might 
be crucial to the administration of whatever treatment is needed before symptoms manifest. 
284. See supra text accompanying notes 190-94. 
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stantly protects the threatened life. In the latter, requiring that one 
aid another in obtaining information that might be necessary to cure a 
disease does not immediately lead to that cure. The information is 
only the first step. Moreover, the harm the relative faces is surely less 
imminent than the harm the viable fetus faces when abortion is at is-
sue. Thus, the level of intrusion is less in the genetics context than in 
the abortion context. Further, the harm to be averted through genetic 
testing is more remote and the cure less directly linked to the state's 
mandate. Therefore, the final balance, when applying this tort anal-
ogy, weighs against finding that the state has a compelling interest in 
protecting life by requiring one to undergo testing just to aid a relative. 
Some lower courts have addressed the issue whether the state may 
compel an individual to undergo medical procedures for the sole pur-
pose of protecting another's life - for example, the donation of bone 
marrow to leukemia patients or the donation of a kidney to people 
suffering from kidney disease. Most of these cases arise in situations in 
which the potential donor is incapable of providing informed consent. 
Consequently, the outcome often turns on who can decide, what stan-
dard of judgment should be used, and how great the harms and bene-
fits are to the potential donee. 28s 
Only one case has actually addressed whether the state can compel 
a competent adult to submit to medical procedures to aid another. In 
McFall v. Shimp, 286 the court vehemently denied the plaintiff's request 
for a preliminary injunction to compel the only compatible donor to 
provide a lifesaving bone marrow transplant for the plaintiff. While 
noting that the defendant's refusal to help the plaintiff was "morally 
indefensible," the court declared 
Our society . . . has as its first principle, the respect for the individual, 
and that society and government exist to protect the individual from be-
ing invaded and hurt by another. . . . For our law to compel defendant to 
285. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (declaring that parents 
have the right to consent to the donation of their seven-year-old daughter's kidney for the benefit 
of her identical twin, ostensibly under a standard of substituted judgment); Curran v. Bosze, 566 
N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (allowing mother of twins to refuse to consent to the donation of their 
bone marrow for the benefit of their father's son, who was their half-brother and who suffered 
from leukemia); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (allowing the mother of an incom-
petent boy to consent to the removal of his kidney to save her other son, nominally under a 
standard of substituted judgment, although finding it to be in the incompetent son's best interest 
to prevent the loss of his brother); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (apply-
ing the best interest standard instead of substituted judgment to conclude that parents could not 
consent to the transplant of their minor, incompetent son's kidney into his sister); Little v. Little, 
576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (allowing parents to give consent to the donation of their 
daughter's kidney for her brother's use because the potential harm to the proposed donor was 
minimal and the psychological benefits in saving her brother's life were great); In re Guardian-
ship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis. 1975) (Denying the sister and guardian of adult 
incompetent male the power to consent to the removal of his kidney to save their sister because, 
when there is no benefit for the one who cannot consent, "no advantage should be taken of 
him."). 
286. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978). 
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submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and prin-
ciple upon which our society is founded. To do so ... would impose a 
rule which would know no limits and one could not imagine where the 
line would be drawn .... 
. . . For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink 
its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck 
from its sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-
wrought concepts of jurisprudence.287 
McFall establishes convincing reasons why the state lacks a com-
pelling interest in requiring a noncooperative relative to participate in 
genetic studies solely for the benefit of another, particularly when the 
compulsion would harm the defendant by forcing her to gain knowl-
edge she has consciously avoided. Given this reasoning and the im-
portant distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, the state's 
interest in protecting life is not compelling. Consequently, mandatory 
testing to aid a relative is unconstitutional. 
2. The Narrowly Tailored Test 
Even assuming argv.endo, that a court could find that the state's 
interest in protecting life is compelling, mandatory testing of one per-
son for the benefit of another could only be constitutional if it were 
narrowly tailored to that compelling interest. To examine whether 
such a mandate is appropriately tailored, diseases must be distin-
guished on the basis of whether they are curable. This subsection ar-
gues that compulsory genetic testing can be narrowly tailored to the 
compelling state interest only when the disease is curable. 
a. Incurable Genetic Diseases. Compulsory genetic screening of 
one person for the benefit of another raises many problems when the 
disease is incurable, as are the vast majority of detectable genetic dis-
eases. 288 Courts have generally upheld legislation to prevent the 
spread of contagious diseases.289 The state can more easily show, 
however, that it narrowly tailored such legislation to its purpose in 
those instances than it could for mandatory genetic testing for incur-
able diseases, which do not pose the immediate threat to current gen-
erations as do infectious ones.290 Therefore, the rationale that genetic 
testing is "necessary for the public health or the public safety" is much 
less convincing than the rationale based on the need to vaccinate a 
community against smallpox.291 
287. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 92. 
288. In fact, the number of detectable genetic diseases without a cure increases as more genes 
are identified. Friedmann, supra note 6, at 412. Examples of detectable diseases without a cure 
include Huntington's disease, cystic fibrosis, neurofibromatosis, and some cancers. See Roberts, 
supra note 86, at 614. 
289. Damme, supra note 21, at 803-04. 
290. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
291. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). 
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Some might claim that protecting fetuses from genetic disease 
would be consistent with the state interest in protecting life. As long 
as the disease in question is incurable, however, compulsory testing 
could only "benefit" the fetus by giving couples the option to termi-
nate pregnancies when fetuses are affected.292 This result violates the 
state interest in protecting life. Given that the fetus is not considered a 
person under Roe v. Wade, 293 whatever rights it has cannot supersede 
the rights of persons,294 at least when the only means of preventing its 
suffering is by abortion. That is, the right of the fetus not to be born, if 
it has such a right, cannot trump the privacy right to decide whether 
to have genetic testing. Notwithstanding ethical arguments that af-
fected fetuses are spared suffering by preventing their birth,295 as long 
as they are considered nonpersons, their "right" not to be born must 
succumb to the rights of constitutionally recognized persons, at least 
before viability. 
Moreover, the legal protection Casey offers fetuses after viability 
would be the very reason to find that they lack a legal right not to be 
born, even to prevent their suffering. Under Casey, the state's interest 
in the viable fetus is compelling, thus justifying the state's ability to 
infringe upon the mother's right of privacy. The basis of the compel-
ling interest, however, is to protect the potentiality of life, whether or 
not the fetus has a genetic disease. Thus the very reason to protect the 
fetus - to protect the potentiality of life - would undermine any 
claim that the fetus has a right not to be born.296 Consequently, as 
long as abortion is the only way to protect the fetus from genetic dis-
ease, compulsory testing is not narrowly tailored to a compelling state 
interest. 
When incurable diseases are at issue, mandatory testing merely 
serves to pit one individual's interest against another's without fulfil-
ling a compelling state interest. Bob's interest in knowing whether he 
has the Huntington's gene, for example, implicates his father's interest 
in remaining ignorant. Superficially, the interest in gaining genetic in-
formation seems similar to the interest in avoiding genetic knowledge, 
but there is a striking difference. The avoidance of knowledge does 
not impinge on or take from another, it merely prevents another from 
292. It might be argued that the fetus can be protected by the couple's decision not to con-
ceive. This solution, however, creates the problem of trying to protect life by preventing its 
existence, which boggles the imagination. "Protecting" the fetus through either means relates to 
the controversial wrongful life cases in which children born with detectable genetic diseases sue 
for their suffering in being born with such ailments. See supra note 167. 
293. 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973). 
294. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990) (en bane) ("Surely ... a fetus cannot 
have rights •.. superior to those of a person who has already been born."). 
295. See James M. Gustafson, Genetic Screening and Human Values, in ETHICAL, SOCIAL 
AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 21, at 201, 207. 
296. See Damme, supra note 21, at 830. 
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gaining something. Bob's father, in refusing testing, does not deprive 
Bob of something he had.297 To fulfil Bob's interest, however, would 
require the violation of his father's interest. Bob's knowledge would 
be the source of his father's loss of chosen ignorance regarding Hunt-
ington's. 298 In addition, it would require disclosure of personal data, 
which Bob's father may also want to avoid.299 
Despite the benefits for Bob - described in detail in subsection 
II.B.2.b300 - if his father cooperated, Bob's father's privacy interests 
should not take second place to Bob's privacy interests. "[C]ourts 
have long recognized the wisdom of acting as though persons could 
never be used as means to the ends of others .... " 301 Whether or not 
judicial expression of this principle is disingenuous, it has ethical sup-
port. 302 To require mandatory testing in this case would be to treat 
Bob's father as a means to fulfil Bob's interests. While Bob's interests 
are significant, they do not involve a preventable disease, which 
presents different issues. 303 If Huntington's were curable, Bob's father 
would probably choose to be tested to avoid succumbing to Hunting-
ton's. When there is nothing one can do to change one's fate, how-
ever, the desire not to know can be quite strong. Thus compelling 
Bob's father to be tested for an incurable disease does not narrowly 
serve a compelling state interest in protecting life. 
Because Sarah's brother is already known to carry the gene for 
Duchenne's muscular dystrophy, however, the privacy concerns are 
far less compelling. Sarah's brother has not decided to avoid learning 
about his genetic status; he has simply chosen not to have his blood 
drawn to obtain a DNA sample. Thus the only arguable privacy in-
trusion would be the collection of a blood sample and the extraction of 
his DNA. Given the Supreme Court's holdings regarding bodily in-
trusion, 304 his decision may not be viewed as a fundamental privacy 
interest so long as there are adequate safeguards against the use of the 
DNA sample for anything other than the determination of the charac-
teristics of his muscular dystrophy gene: that is, if his genetic testing 
297. This is much like the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction discussed, supra, in the text 
accompanying notes 283-84. 
298. The same cannot be said of Sarah's brother, which leads to a significant distinction 
between the two scenarios, as discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 304-05. 
299. See supra subsection 11.B.2.a. This additional concern does not necessarily coexist with 
the desire not to know, but it potentially might. 
300. See also supra text accompanying notes 62, 70, 82-86. 
301. TRIBE, supra note 207, § 15-9, at 1335. 
302. Immanuel Kant's moral imperative urges people to treat others as autonomous moral 
agents and to "[a]ct in such a way that you always treat humanity ..• never simply as a means, 
but always at the same time as an end." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE META• 
PHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton ed. & trans., 1964) (1785). 
303. See infra subsection III.D.2.b. 
304. See, e.g., supra note 257. 
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is purely informative.305 This situation more closely parallels the is-
sues of disclosure addressed in Part II306 because a fundamental pri-
vacy right is not at stake. 
b. Curable Genetic Diseases. While the state cannot narrowly tai-
lor mandatory genetic testing of incurable diseases to its compelling 
interest in protecting lives - if such an interest could be found com-
pelling, which it should not307 - it potentially can be so drawn for 
detection of a curable disease. It is important to note, however, that 
for two reasons the conflicts described in this Note are far less likely to 
arise when a cure is available. First, if Bob's father knew treatment 
could prevent Huntington's from developing, for example, he would 
have good reason to want to know if he is a carrier. Therefore, the 
availability of a cure may strongly motivate otherwise uncooperative 
relatives to participate in family studies; they would have a vested in-
terest in finding out whether they were carriers. Disclosure issues 
might still arise in these settings, however. 308 Second, as long as the 
cure involves gene therapy, linkage analysis probably will not be re-
quired. That is, because gene therapy involves correcting the specific 
genetic defect, it would almost always be necessary to have isolated the 
disease gene and to have identified the particular mutation in the pa-
tient. If linkage analysis is the only method to test for the gene, gene 
therapy is unlikely to be available for that disease. To state this con-
versely, when gene therapy becomes feasible for a particular disease, it 
almost surely will no longer be necessary to use other family members 
for genetic testing. Thus, in those instances, the conflicts this Part 
discusses would dissolve. Nonetheless, viable gene therapy is years 
away for most genetic diseases, especially dominant diseases such as 
Huntington's. 
If such conflicts arise when a cure is available and a court finds 
that the state's interest in protecting life by requiring genetic testing is 
compelling, mandatory genetic testing is arguably narrowly drawn to 
this interest. Newborn screening statutes, for example, require the 
testing of select genetic diseases that can be virtually "cured" through 
restrictive diets or medications. 309 Even diseases such as sickle cell 
anemia, which are not exactly "curable,'' can be significantly amelio-
305. Cf. supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
306. See supra text accompanying notes 88-200. 
307. See supra text accompanying notes 283-87. 
308. See supra Part II. 
309. Preventive measures can sometimes mitigate the harm from nonworking genes. For 
example, providing the affected individual with a restrictive diet can virtually cure PKU. An 
individual with PKU has a pair of nonworking genes that, if they functioned properly, would 
encode the enzyme (phenylalanine hydroxylase) that breaks down an amino acid called phenylal-
anine. When an affected individual consumes food with phenylalanine, the body cannot metabo-
lize the amino acid; consequently, excess stores of the compound accumulate, causing irreparable 
neurological damage. Diets with low levels of phenylalanine prevent the accumulation of the 
amino acid. STRYER, supra note 47, at 426-27; Ara Tourian & James B. Sidbury, 
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rated with prophylactic measures that greatly lengthen one's lifes-
pan. 310 The clear purpose behind these statutes is to protect 
individuals from life-threatening diseases. Newborn screening statutes 
that involve curable diseases are probably sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored to the state's interest in protecting life, especially because no al-
ternative approaches exist to fulfil this state interest.311 
If an individual is at risk for affliction with a curable genetic dis-
ease, requiring the appropriate relative to be screened would fulfil the 
state's interest in protecting that person. If the person is merely at risk 
for being an unaffected carrier, the question becomes more compli-
cated. In this scenario, the potential carrier's life is not at risk, but the 
lives of her future children are. Under the analysis of Roe and Casey, 
mandatory genetic testing in this case could only be constitutional 
when the at-risk fetus becomes viable. 
Even if both parts of the strict scrutiny analysis were fulfilled for 
curable diseases, however, public policy argues against mandating 
such testing. To use one person for the benefit of another, as the Mc-
Fall court argued, goes against the principles upon which our country 
is founded. 3 12 Moreover, it conflicts with the important Kantian prin-
ciple that individuals should not be treated as the means to others' 
ends.3 I3 Although an individual's unwillingness to help another might 
be morally reprehensible, it does not follow that the state should com-
pel testing when testing implicates fundamental privacy rights. Fi-
nally and most importantly, the belief in the genetic counseling 
community that one should never be compelled to undergo genetic 
testing stems from fear of repeating the abuses of genetic testing and 
the eugenics movements that plagued our past.3 I4 To prevent genetic 
Phenylketonuria and Hyperphenylalaninemia, in THE METABOLIC BASIS OF INHERITED DIS-
EASE, supra note 16, at 270, 271; see supra note 52. 
310. See supra note 52. 
311. Even if the state interest in mandating genetic testing solely for the benefit of another is 
not compelling, it might be for newborn screening purposes. In that case, testing is for the 
purpose of the testee, rather than a third party. Therefore, the concerns of using one individual 
for another's purpose do not apply. The problem of requiring one to undergo a procedure with-
out one's consent remains, however. Nevertheless, this issue is different from Bob's scenario 
because it involves infants who are incapable of giving consent. It is possible that newborn 
screening is only constitutional if parents have the right to refuse testing, as they do in some 
states, see, e.g., FLA. STA.§ 383.14 (1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 40:1299.1(West1992); Miss. 
CODE ANN. § 41-21-203 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 442.115 (1991); N.H. REV, STAT. 
ANN.§ 132:10-c (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 24-1-6(A) (Michie 1991), or if they must give con-
sent before such tests are performed. Even were a compelling state interest found in the newborn 
screening context, there is the additional problem that many mandatory screening statutes do not 
actually require medical treatment for infants identified as having one of the inborn errors of 
metabolism. See Damme, supra note 21, at 823. This potentially raises questions about how 
narrowly tailored the statutes are to their purpose. The discussion of these issues, however, is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
312. See supra text accompanying notes 286-87. 
313. See supra notes 301-02 and accompanying text. 
314. See supra note 6. 
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testing from stepping on a path that could potentially lead to actions 
just short of eugenics, we must maintain voluntary genetic testing. 
The notion of disease and illness is not static, nor is it void of value 
judgments.315 To compel testing to help a relative learn whether she 
has Huntington's, for example, may rest at the top of a slippery slope 
that could lead to compulsory testing to help a relative learn about 
risks of "affiictions," such as sterility, mental disability, or dwarfing 
syndromes. Therefore our legal system should carefully protect the 
principle of voluntariness with regard to genetic testing. 
Thus, to summarize this Part, under the Due Process Clause, the 
right to refuse to learn about one's genetic status should receive consti-
tutional protection. Such testing involves fundamental aspects of au-
tonomy and personhood, which are akin to other constitutionally 
protected privacy rights, including the right to make important deci-
sions regarding marriage, procreation, and contraception. Because the 
state' interest is not compelling, mandatory genetic testing of one per-
son for the benefit of another would fail the strict scrutiny test and 
would be therefore be unconstitutional. 
Even assuming arguendo that courts would find the state interest 
compelling, compulsory testing for incurable diseases is not narrowly 
tailored to the state interest and would therefore still be constitution-
ally prohibited. If a curable disease is at stake, the tailoring test would 
arguably be met. Nonetheless, there are strong normative and policy 
arguments against compulsory testing in those contexts. Thus, be-
cause no case law specifically precludes mandatory genetic testing for 
another's benefit,316 legislation should be enacted to protect this im-
portant privacy right and to maintain respect for the importance of 
voluntariness in genetic testing.317 
IV. GUIDELINES FOR COURTS AND LEGISLATURES 
Courts or legislatures faced with the issues of mandatory genetic 
testing and the disclosure of test results should consider the legal and 
constitutional implications that these two issues pose. Section IV.A 
proposes guidelines so that courts and legislatures can protect the fun-
damental privacy interests involved in making decisions regarding 
whether to have genetic testing. Section IV.B describes the delicate 
balancing of interests necessary to determine when test results may be 
315. For an insightful discussion of the meaning of disease in the genetics context, see Arthur 
L. Caplan, I/Gene Therapy Is the Cure, What Is the Disease? in, GENE MAPPING, supra note 1, 
at 128. Particularly relevant is the fact that genetics is the study of variation. While it seems 
unproblematic to identify Tay Sachs as a disease, it is important to note that Tays Sachs repre-
sents a genetic variant that we call "abnormal." The line drawn between "abnormal" variation 
as disease, and "normal" variation as health is not always so clear. See id. at 131. 
316. Green & Capron, supra note 91, at 76. 
317. See infra Part IV. 
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disclosed. Any legislative proposal should recognize the competing 
and complex interests at stake. 
A. Genetic Testing 
Legislation or judicial decisions should clearly prohibit involuntary 
genetic testing for incurable disease.318 People should not be com-
pelled to have genetic testing for the benefit of a relative, particularly if 
they do not know their genetic status. Legislation or judicial decisions 
should be made with an eye toward encouraging informed consent, 
education, and genetic counseling services so that people can deter-
mine whether genetic testing is appropriate for them. Decisions re-
garding genetic testing and reproductive choices should be left entirely 
to the discretion of the patient because these decisions involve funda-
mental rights of privacy and autonomy. Consequently, the state 
should not interfere by compelling such testing or by imposing moral 
views that encourage certain decisions over others. Moreover, com-
pulsory testing would likely fail constitutional requirements.319 
B. Disclosure of Test Results 
Legislatures or courts should not mandate disclosure to high-risk 
relatives, even when there may be clear benefits to the relatives. In-
stead, physicians or genetic counselors should have the privilege to 
disclose test results if the interest in informing relatives strongly out-
weighs the interest in confidentiality. To compare these interests, 
courts and legislatures should consider the following criteria: 
a) The physician or counselor should educate the patient about 
the need to inform family members at significant risk of carrying the 
disease gene. If the patient refuses, the physician or counselor should 
try to elicit the patient's concerns. 
b) The family history and nature of the genetic disease should 
show that the relatives in question have a significant risk of carrying 
the gene and having an affected child, a significant risk of developing 
the genetic disease themselves, or a significant susceptibility to a mul-
tifactorial disease. The significance of the risk should include both the 
probability of carrying the gene and the severity of the potential harm. 
c) At-risk relatives must have options to use the information to 
make reproductive decisions through prenatal testing or gene therapy; 
to take preventive health care measures, such as prophylactic surgery, 
cancer screening, diet alteration, avoidance of behavior that can cause 
318. This prohibition, however, probably would not include newborn screening statutes that 
screen for treatable diseases or those that can be ameliorated. See supra notes 309-11 and accom-
panying text. 
319. See supra Part III. 
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severe symptoms, or gene therapy; or to make lifestyle choices, partic-
ularly when late-onset diseases are involved. 
d) The harm in disclosure should be assessed by considering such 
factors as social stigma, the effect on other people's willingness to be 
tested, and the patient's reasons for failing to disclose. 
e) The physician or counselor should tell the patient she plans to 
inform the particular family members as well as the reasons for mak-
ing such a decision. 
f) The physician or counselor should avoid revealing the patient's 
identity when informing the relative or the relative's physician of the 
risk, whenever possible. In addition, the physician or counselor 
should offer referrals for genetic counseling at genetic centers in the 
relative's area. 
Given the presumption in favor of confidentiality, a close examina-
tion of the above factors best ensures that disclosure only takes place 
to prevent the greater harm. 
CONCLUSION 
Genetic testing has the potential to affect far more people than just 
the proband. When conflicts arise between the patient and family 
members with an arguably vested interest in knowing the patient's ge-
netic status, various legal principles must be applied. Once one has 
decided to learn whether one carries a particular gene, the interests at 
stake are based on common law principles. Thus, in carefully pre-
scribed situations, the carrier-proband's interests may be overridden to 
prevent relatives from suffering harm. A presumption in favor of pre-
serving confidentiality should prevail unless there is evidence that the 
harm in failing to disclose is greater than the harm from disclosure. 
To perform this balancing test adequately, courts and legislatures 
must carefully consider a number of factors. Physicians or genetic 
counselors, however, ·should never be compelled to warn relatives at 
risk because the patient does not create the risk. Similarly, the pro-
band has no legal duty to warn relatives, though she may have a moral 
duty. The proband does not have the requisite special relationship 
with her siblings, cousins, and other relatives to impose such a legal 
duty. Moreover, she has no affirmative duty to protect others from 
perils she has not caused. 320 
When someone, for his own benefit, wants to have a relative tested, 
the relative's constitutional privacy and autonomy interests in decid-
ing whether to learn of his genetic status should not be trumped by the 
320. When the proband is a parent, she of course has special duties to protect her minor 
child, given the custodial nature of this relationship. See supra text accompanying note 198. 
When the "identifiable" victim is a living minor child, different issues arise regarding the legal 
principles of minors and consent in the medical context. Such issues are beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
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other's interest in gaining genetic information. It is unlikely that there 
is a compelling state interest in such instances, thus compulsory test-
ing would be unconstitutional. Even if a court were to find that the 
state's interest is compelling, however, testing for incurable disease 
would not be narrowly drawn to the state interest. Consequently, 
mandatory tests for incurable diseases would still fail strict scrutiny 
analysis. Yet, even if courts found mandatory testing for curable dis-
eases constitutional, genetic testing for the benefit of a relative should 
always remain voluntary for public policy and normative reasons. 
Ideally, the scenarios that lead to the consideration of these princi-
ples would never arise because the interests of all family members 
would be consistent. Nevertheless, given human nature, such conflicts 
do sometimes develop. Courts or legislatures faced with these issues 
should follow the proposed guidelines to ensure that the applicable 
constitutional and common law principles properly protect the com-
peting interests. 
